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Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
Paul P. Daley*
George W. Shuster, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Every practitioner, whether a business lawyer or a litigator, comes
into contact with the Bankruptcy Code and the bankruptcy courts.
Business clients are often creditors in the bankruptcy proceedings of
other entities, and they may be defendants in preferential or fraudu-
lent transfer actions. Both lawyers who litigate in federal and state
courts and lawyers who advise clients on business transactions are
likely to encounter situations that require an understanding of bank-
ruptcy court jurisdiction and litigation procedure.
In most ways, bankruptcy court practice is conducted in the same
manner as litigation in the federal district courts. However, for consti-
tutional, historical, and practical reasons, bankruptcy court litigants
must contend with a number of jurisdictional and procedural concepts
not encountered in the federal district courts. For practitioners not
familiar with the bankruptcy courts, this article is intended as an intro-
duction to some of these bankruptcy-specific concepts. For bank-
ruptcy court practitioners, this article is intended as a reminder of the
background against which our practices are conducted.
This paper will focus on those aspects of bankruptcy court jurisdic-
tion most likely to arise when creditor clients find themselves involved
in proceedings not of their choosing. These issues are largely unique
to practice under the Bankruptcy Code but may arise in the most com-
mon of a client's business relationships.
To begin, there are five key sources of statutes and rules affecting
bankruptcy jurisdiction and procedure. Title 28 of the United States
Code ("Title 28"), entitled "Judiciary and Judiciary Procedure," estab-
lishes and limits the bankruptcy jurisdiction of district courts and
bankruptcy courts. Title 11 of the United States Code (the "Bank-
ruptcy Code") establishes courts' substantive bankruptcy powers,
some of which affect bankruptcy jurisdiction. The Bankruptcy Rules
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of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court under 28
U.S.C. § 2075 (the "Bankruptcy Rules") dictate the procedure to be
followed in bankruptcy cases. The Bankruptcy Rules often incorpo-
rate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure promulgated by the Su-
preme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (the "Federal Rules"), which are
generally applicable in federal litigation. Finally, each bankruptcy dis-
trict may have its own Local Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the "Lo-
cal Bankruptcy Rules"), which function to alter or supplement the
procedures set forth in the Bankruptcy Rules and the Federal Rules,
as well as to establish particular operating procedures for its district.
The sections that follow-"Getting into Bankruptcy Court," "Liti-
gating in Bankruptcy Court," and "Getting Out of Bankruptcy
Court"-track the most important jurisdictional and procedural issues
through Title 28, the Bankruptcy Code, the Federal Rules, and the
Bankruptcy Rules. "Getting into Bankruptcy Court" describes the
basis for bankruptcy court jurisdiction, the proper venue for bank-
ruptcy court cases and proceedings, the removal of state court actions
to bankruptcy court, and the intervention into bankruptcy court ac-
tions. "Litigating in Bankruptcy Court" describes the manner in
which bankruptcy court proceedings are commenced, the unique
forms of discovery available in bankruptcy courts, the procedures for
approving settlements in bankruptcy courts, the limits on the bank-
ruptcy courts' ability to conduct jury trials, the routes and procedures
for appeals from decisions of the bankruptcy courts, and the remedies
available for contempt in the bankruptcy courts. "Getting Out of
Bankruptcy Court" describes three ways that a proceeding may exit
the bankruptcy courts: remand to state courts, abstention in favor of
other courts, and withdrawal of the reference by the federal district
courts. This paper does not include a discussion of the ordinary mo-
tion practice that drives a bankruptcy case, as this topic would require
an in-depth analysis of the substance of the Bankruptcy Code and
would be of less utility to the business lawyer and the non-bankruptcy
litigator.
II. GETTING INTO BANKRUPTCY COURT
A. Jurisdiction
1. Development of Current Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction
a. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended in 1938 by the
Chandler Act, bankruptcy proceedings were conducted under the ju-
risdiction of the United States district courts by "referees," who were
[Vol. 3:383
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"officers and employees of the district court."1 Referees were ap-
pointed, reappointed, and removed by the district courts. These refer-
ees, later called bankruptcy judges, had limited jurisdiction, and
bankruptcy cases were always subject to removal to the district court
by the district court judge.2
The Bankruptcy Act distinguished between matters over which the
bankruptcy judge could exert jurisdiction (those within the court's
"summary jurisdiction") and matters related to the bankruptcy over
which the bankruptcy court could not exercise jurisdiction ("plenary
matters"). To reach this distinction, the Bankruptcy Act first distin-
guished between controversies at law and in equity, on the one hand,
and proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act, on the other hand. While
a bankruptcy judge could determine the outcomes of proceedings aris-
ing under the Bankruptcy Act, his or her summary jurisdiction over
controversies at law or in equity was limited to (1) disputes with re-
spect to property in the actual or constructive possession of the bank-
ruptcy court, and (2) disputes in which the adverse party consented to
a trial before a bankruptcy judge.3 The summary jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court stood in contrast to the bankruptcy court's lack of
jurisdiction over plenary matters, which were triable only by the dis-
trict court or relevant state court. The limitation on the power of the
bankruptcy judge to hear and determine controversies such as prefer-
ences and fraudulent conveyances (plenary jurisdiction matters) came
to be regarded as a major obstacle to the expeditious and efficient
administration of bankruptcy cases.
b. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,4 was designed, inter alia, to
eliminate the jurisdictional limitations on the power of bankruptcy
judges to determine the outcomes of disputes arising during the ad-
ministration of bankruptcy proceedings. This goal was accomplished
by creating a single bankruptcy forum with power to hear and resolve
all disputes and lawsuits relating to the administration of the bank-
ruptcy case.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act did not confer pervasive jurisdiction
directly on the bankruptcy judges. Instead, the statute invested the
district courts with power over cases and civil proceedings "arising
1. Pub. L. No. 55-541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898) (the "Bankruptcy Act"), §§ 1(8), 22, 33.
2. Bankruptcy Act § 38.
3. Bankruptcy Act §§ 2, 22, 23. See also 1 CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE: A GUIDE TO
REORGANIZATION § 1:23, at 1-83 (James F. Queenan, Jr., et al., eds., 1999).
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101, et seq.
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under title 11 or arising in or related to cases under title 11." 5 The
Bankruptcy Reform Act then directed that this jurisdictional power
be exercised directly by the bankruptcy court, which was to be an en-
tity separate and independent from the district court.6 The broad ju-
risdictional grant in the Bankruptcy Reform Act was intended to
eliminate the pervasive litigation over jurisdiction that occurred under
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 by creating an independent bankruptcy
court possessing broad jurisdictional power over all matters related to
a bankruptcy case. The new bankruptcy court was to be an adjunct of
the district court.
In passing the Bankruptcy Reform Act, Congress created, along
with the new bankruptcy court, a new category of federal judge, called
a United States Bankruptcy Judge. These judges were granted origi-
nal and exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and original, non-
exclusive jurisdiction over civil proceedings "arising under," "arisingin," or "related to" cases under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, including
jurisdiction over all property of the debtor, wherever located. 7 The
bankruptcy judges were vested with the powers of courts of equity,
law, and admiralty and were authorized to issue any order, process, or
judgment appropriate to carry out the provisions of the new Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act, including the issuance of writs of habeas corpus.8
The bankruptcy judges were also expressly empowered to conduct
jury trials.9 Lastly, the bankruptcy judges were authorized to decline
to hear a particular proceeding within the bankruptcy court's jurisdic-
tion and to exercise this discretion to abstain without review by
appeal. 10
The district court retained jurisdiction over proceedings seeking to
enjoin an action in another court, certain criminal contempt proceed-
ings, and appeals from the bankruptcy court."
c. Northern Pipeline Construction v. Marathon Pipeline Company
The system contemplated by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
never had an opportunity to take root. The system failed on June 28,
1982, when the United States Supreme Court handed down its deci-
sion in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co. 12
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (repealed).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 1471(c) (repealed).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (repealed).
8. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1481 and 2256 (repealed).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1480 (repealed).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) (repealed).
11. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1481 and 1482 (repealed).
12. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
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In a confusing four-justice plurality opinion, the Supreme Court de-
clared that the broad jurisdictional powers granted to the bankruptcy
court under the Bankruptcy Reform Act were unconstitutional. The
essence of the holding by the Supreme Court was that Congress could
not constitutionally imbue Article I adjunct judges with the authority
to adjudicate constitutional and state law rights on a final basis, where
the adjunct judges were not appointed under or subject to the protec-
tions of Article 111.13
The Supreme Court stayed the effective date of its decision in Mar-
athon until October 4, 1982, to allow Congress to revise the statute.
Congress failed to act by that date or to meet subsequent extensions,
and the district courts had no choice but to reappoint as magistrates
the bankruptcy judges whose terms expired and to adopt emergency
rules in order to keep the system functioning.
d. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984
A final resolution of the jurisdictional problems of the bankruptcy
system was reached on July 10, 1984, when Congress enacted the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
("BAFJA"). That legislation amended 28 U.S.C. § 1334, which was
the pre-1978 bankruptcy jurisdiction statute, to provide the district
courts with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under title
11 and original but not exclusive jurisdiction over all civil proceedings
"arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11."
Under 28 U.S.C. § 151, bankruptcy judges were authorized to act as
"units" of the district courts, and, under 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), the dis-
trict courts were empowered to refer to the bankruptcy court all cases
under title 11 and all proceedings under, arising in, or related to a case
under title 11. Orders have been entered in every judicial district re-
ferring such cases and proceedings to the bankruptcy courts. How-
ever, the district court remains the "court of bankruptcy" under the
BAFJA just as it was under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.
2. Personal Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts
The standards for personal jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases are very
broad, with some variation from circuit to circuit. Courts generally
agree that defendants do not need to have minimum contacts with the
forum state, but rather need to have minimum contacts only with the
13. Such protections include appointment for life and protection from salary decrease while in
office. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.
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United States as a whole. 14 Courts often point to Bankruptcy Rule
7004, which provides for nationwide service of process by first-class
mail, as the basis for the broad personal jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
courts.
15
However, courts disagree on whether due process concerns require
courts to make a separate determination of the "fairness" of exerting
jurisdiction over a defendant who lacks minimum contacts with a fo-
rum. Although a majority of courts has found that the national mini-
mum contacts test alone fulfills the requirements of due process, 16 a
minority of courts has held that if the defendant demonstrates a lib-
erty interest in not being compelled to the out-of-state forum, the
court must then balance the defendant's liberty interest against the
strength of the policy interest in holding the proceeding in a central
forum.' 7
In 1996, the Supreme Court, by amending the Bankruptcy Rules,
clarified what is required to establish personal jurisdiction over for-
eign corporations under Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f). Serving a sum-
mons on a foreign defendant now clearly suffices to establish personal
jurisdiction over that defendant where constitutionally permissible. 18
14. See, e.g., In re Federal Fountain, 165 F.3d 600, 601 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that United
States contacts were sufficient to establish jurisdiction because of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d));
Brown v. C.D. Smith Drug Co., 1999 WL 709992 (D. Del. 1999) (same).
15. See id.; Federal Fountain, 165 F.3d at 601. Courts have consistently found notice by mail in
accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 7004 constitutional. See id. (stating that elementary, widely-
accepted legal principles provide foundation for proposition that Bankruptcy Rule 7004(d) is
constitutional).
16. See, e.g., Federal Fountain, 165 F.3d at 601 (noting that nothing in case law suggests that
fairness test is required); In re Celotex Corp., 124 F.3d 619, 628-30 (4th Cit. 1997) (stating in
dicta that only relevant question is whether defendant possesses sufficient minimum contacts
with the U.S.); Brown, 1999 WL709992 at *3 (stating that majority of lower courts have con-
cluded that defendant need only have minimum contacts with the U.S., and analogizing situation
to circuit court rulings that under non-bankruptcy statutes providing for nationwide service of
process, only existence of minimum contacts with U.S. is relevant); Medical Mutual of Ohio v. de
Soto, 245 F.3d 561, 567-68 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that showing of minimum contacts with
United States fulfills due process personal jurisdiction concerns under ERISA nationwide ser-
vice of process provision).
17. See Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) S.A., 119 F.3d 935, 945-47 (11th
Cir. 1997) (finding in RICO case that due process required both an examination of minimum
contacts with U.S. and a comparison of liberty interest of defendant with federal interests, but
that defendant had not shown that it would be "severely disadvantaged," and so no liberty inter-
est was at issue in case); Peay v. Bellsouth Medical Assistance Plan, 205 F.3d 1206, 1211 (10th
Cir. 2000) (same, but ERISA case); Glinka v. Abraham and Rose Co. Ltd., 199 B.R. 484, 497
(D.Vt. 1996) (stating in dicta that test for bankruptcy personal jurisdiction would involve inquiry
into minimum contacts with the U.S. and reasonableness of forum to defendant); In re Pacques,
277 B.R. 615, 624 & 628 (E.D. Penn. 2000) (finding no substantial unfairness to foreign defen-
dant sufficient to violate fairness prong of due process test in bankruptcy case).
18. Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f). See also In re Pintlar, 133 F.3d 1141, 1144-47 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing operation of Bankruptcy Rule 7004(f)); In re Pacques, 277 B.R. 615, 629-38 (E.D.
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In contrast to general federal court diversity jurisdiction, there is no
"amount in controversy" requirement to establish bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion. 19 Similarly, a majority of courts has found that the monetary
requirement for pursuit of a chapter 13 case under section 109 is an
eligibility requirement, not a jurisdictional requirement, so courts
whose cases are found ineligible for chapter 13 treatment may retain
jurisdiction over the conversion of the case to chapter 7.2o
Even if a bankruptcy court would not otherwise have jurisdiction
over a particular party or entity, a party may consciously or inadver-
tently consent to the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction, most commonly
by filing a claim against the debtor.21 Additionally, failure to timely
object to the bankruptcy court's personal jurisdiction may result in a
waiver of that objection.22
3. In Rem Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts
Two statutes provide the bankruptcy courts with in rem jurisdiction.
First, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) states:
The district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is
pending shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all of the property,
wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such
case, and of property of the estate.23
Second, section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code establishes an estate of
the debtor as of the commencement of the bankruptcy case that in-
cludes all property and property rights of the debtor as of that date.
Together, section 1334(e) of Title 28 and section 541 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code provide the district courts, and thus the bankruptcy
Penn. 2000) (explaining pre-1996 confusion about personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations
and explaining operation of Bankruptcy Rule 7004 generally); In re North, 279 B.R. 845, 851-53
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (holding that the national contacts test is the measure for personal juris-
diction over foreign corporations even if the actual method of service was valid under a different
rule of federal procedure). A full discussion of the interrelationship between domestic and for-
eign bankruptcy proceedings (as controlled by 11 U.S.C. § 304) is beyond the scope of this paper.
19. See In re Griggs, 181 B.R. 111 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1994); Rudd v. Laughlin, 866 F.2d
1040, 1041-42 (8th Cir. 1989).
20. See id. at 113 (noting that Fifth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits find Section 109 requirement to
be one establishing eligibility, not jurisdiction); In re Verdunn, 210 B.R. 621, 623-24 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1997) (acknowledging split among courts).
21. See Langenkamp v. C.A. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 44-45 (1990) (holding that party filing proof of
claim submits itself to equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy court, and so waives its right to a jury
trial); In re PNP Holdings Corp., 99 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that foreign corporation
consents to court's jurisdiction by filing proof of claim).
22. See In re I.A. Durbin, Inc., 62 B.R. 139, 144 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (by delaying objection until
eve of trial, and by joining in counterclaim without stating non-consent to jurisdiction, creditor
was found to have consented to jurisdiction of bankruptcy court).
23. This provision replaced and is identical to the former 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d).
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courts, with in rem jurisdiction over all property of the debtor wher-
ever that property may be situated.24 This in rem jurisdiction extends
to all property in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor.25
The bankruptcy court loses jurisdiction over the debtor's property
only when the property is lawfully transferred out of the estate.26
The in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts generally takes pre-
cedence over the jurisdiction of other federal and state courts. 27 How-
ever, the recent decisions of the Second Circuit in the NextWave
Personal Communications, Inc. bankruptcy have restricted the ability
of the bankruptcy courts to hear cases involving federal regulatory
matters where Congress has delegated exclusive authority over such
matters to the federal executive branch.28
The doctrinal ground grows vague at the intersection of the bank-
ruptcy courts' in rem jurisdiction and their personal jurisdiction. May
the debt of a creditor be adjudicated by a bankruptcy court pursuant
to its in rem jurisdiction over the debtor and its estate even where the
bankruptcy court lacks personal jurisdiction over the creditor? The
Supreme Court has recently held, based in part on Supreme Court
precedent in California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc.,29 that the bank-
ruptcy courts' in rem jurisdiction may be a sufficient basis for an ac-
tion by a debtor against a state to discharge the state's claim against
the debtor, even where the state alleges that the bankruptcy court
24. See In re United States Brass Corp., 110 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that under
section 1334(e) (formerly 1334(d)), creditors must enforce their rights in the bankruptcy court
regardless of the location of the creditor or the property).
25. See In re Fedpak Systems, Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating that bankruptcy
court has jurisdiction over property owned by or in the actual or constructive possession of the
debtor, but finding that property legitimately sold outside of the estate passed beyond court's
jurisdiction).
26. See id. at 214.
27. See Chao v. Hospital Staffing Services, Inc., 270 F.3d 374, 383-87 (6th Cir. 2002) (explain-
ing in detail extent of bankruptcy court's exclusive and non-exclusive jurisdictions over property
and holding that bankruptcy court possessed exclusive jurisdiction over action by Department of
Labor to recover business records produced using illegal labor because action did not qualify
under police power exception to jurisdiction); Gilchrist v. General Electric Capital Corp., 262
F.3d 295, 303-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that jurisdiction over property belonged in bankruptcy
court rather than in court in which receivership proceeding was filed); In re White, 851 F.2d 170,
172-74 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that while bankruptcy stay prevented pursuit of state court di-
vorce proceeding, bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by lifting the stay to allow the
state court proceeding to continue); Adams v. S/V "Tenacious", 203 B.R. 297, 299 (D. Alaska
1996) (holding that bankruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to decide admiralty claims related to
estate property).
28. See In re NextWave Personal Communications, Inc., 235 B.R. 277 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999),
affd, 241 B.R. 311 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), rev'd, 200 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 924
(2000); In re F.C.C., 217 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1029 (2000).
29. 523 U.S. 491 (1998).
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lacks personal jurisdiction because of Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity.30
4. Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Courts
a. The Distinction Between Core Proceedings and
Non-Core Proceedings
Bankruptcy courts' subject matter jurisdiction is divided into two
categories: the courts' extensive jurisdiction over "core" matters, and
the courts' more limited jurisdiction over "non-core" matters. Bank-
ruptcy judges have an affirmative duty to determine whether a pro-
ceeding is a core or non-core proceeding.
31
The distinction between core and non-core proceedings is relevant
for two main reasons. First, section 157(c)(1) states that the bank-
ruptcy courts may hear "non-core" but "related to" proceedings but
may not enter final orders or judgments in such matters-the bank-
ruptcy courts may only submit proposed findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law regarding such proceedings to the district court. The
district court judge must then consider the bankruptcy court findings
and conclusions, review de novo any matter to which a party below
has objected, and enter a judgment.32 The parties to a proceeding
may, however, consent to the entry of judgment by a bankruptcy
judge in a non-core proceeding pursuant to section 157(c)(2). 33 The
second reason the distinction is important is that bankruptcy courts
may not conduct jury trials in non-core matters. Therefore, if a party
possesses a right to a jury trial in a non-core case, the bankruptcy
court may not be able to hear that case.
34
Initially, commentators and practitioners were concerned that the
core/non-core distinction would recreate the summary/plenary juris-
diction battles of the past. In part, such fears have been allayed over
time, as bankruptcy courts have generally been found to possess ex-
pansive jurisdiction to hear most matters affecting a bankruptcy. Still,
30. See Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
31. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3).
32. Bankruptcy Rule 9033 outlines the procedure for implementing this provision of section
157. Although Bankruptcy Rules 7008(a) and 7012(b) require that complaints, counterclaims,
and cross-claims allege whether a proceeding is core or non-core and plead consent or non-
consent, the Bankruptcy Rules do not provide a stand-alone process for bringing this jurisdic-
tional issue to the bankruptcy judge's attention so that a formal ruling can be made early in the
litigation.
33. The only exception to this rule is for personal injury and wrongful death claims, which are
designated as a special category of non-core proceedings and may be tried only by the district
court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(5).
34. See In re Northwestern Institute of Psychiatry, 268 B.R. 79, 85 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 2001)
(reviewing consequences of case being labeled "non-core" rather than "core").
2005]
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the distinction between core and non-core matters has resulted in fre-
quent litigation of jurisdictional issues, perhaps because statutory im-
precision and the absence of legislative history have produced case
law that can be cited to support almost any reasonable position.
b. Core Proceedings
Under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), the bankruptcy courts have the power
to "hear and determine all cases under title 11 and all core proceed-
ings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11," and to
enter final orders and judgments as to those matters. Section
157(b)(2) then sets forth a non-exclusive list of core proceedings. This
list encompasses almost every conceivable bankruptcy-related subject
and could be read to exceed the boundaries of the Marathon decision.
Therefore, a determination of whether a matter is core or non-core
depends not only on the statutory grant of jurisdiction, but also on the
limits provided by constitutional doctrine.
Under the list set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2), core proceedings
include, but are not limited to:
* matters concerning the administration of the estate;
* allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or ex-
emptions from the property of the estate, and estimation of
claims or interests for the purposes of confirming a plan of
reorganization under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of title 11, but not
the liquidation or estimation of contingent or unliquidated
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the es-
tate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
* counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims
against the estate;
" orders in respect to obtaining credit;
" orders to turn over property of the estate;
* proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
" motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
" proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
* determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
* objections to the discharge;
* determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
" confirmations of plans;
" orders approving the use or lease of property, including the
use of cash collateral;
[Vol. 3:383
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* orders approving the sale of property other than property re-
sulting from claims brought by the estate against persons who
have not filed claims against the estate;
* other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the
estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity
security holder relationship, except personal injury tort or
wrongful death claims; and
* recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under
the new chapter 15.
As discussed above, it is impossible to state with certainty the pre-
cise meaning or limit of each of these categories of core matters,
which are in any event not exhaustive. The determination of whether
a particular matter is a core or non-core proceeding will ultimately
depend upon the circumstances of the particular case.
Bearing this difficulty in mind, it is possible to synthesize court deci-
sions into a rough test, in the form of a series of questions to be asked
when confronted with the core/non-core issue.
The first question to be asked is whether the proceeding clearly be-
longs to one of the categories listed in section 157(b). Courts have
had an easier time finding that matters are core proceedings when the
cases unambiguously fit into one of the section 157(b) categories. Ex-
amples of proceedings that clearly meet one of the categories are
those involving liens and those involving the turnover of funds of the
debtor.35
Whether or not the proceeding is clearly within one of the section
157(b) categories, it should next be asked whether the proceeding "in-
voke[s] a substantive right provided by title 11" or whether it is "a
proceeding that, by its nature, could arise only in the context of a
bankruptcy case," in order to ensure that the constitutional strictures
of Marathon are met.36 Some courts have expressly noted that, while
section 157(b)(3) specifically states that the determination of whether
a suit is a core or non-core proceeding should not be made solely on
the basis of whether state law (rather than federal bankruptcy law) is
35. See In re Lionel Corporation, 29 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating in case involving
mechanics' lien that jurisdiction was "clearly established" under Section 157(b)(2)(G)); In re
Silva, 185 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Ninth Circuit has "expressly" held that bank-
ruptcy courts have authority to require the turnover of property of the estate pursuant to Section
157(b)(2)(E)).
36. Halper v. Halper, 164 F.3d 830, 836 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing cases and noting that this test has
been followed by numerous other circuits, including the Sixth, Seventh, Eight, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits); In re Toledo, 170 F.3d 1340, 1348-49 (11th Cir. 1999) (tracing history of the test back to
the Fifth Circuit decision in In re Wood, 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987)).
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implicated, many decisions show that the implication of state law is a
primary factor in the balance.37
Third, it is helpful to ask whether the proceeding involves property
of the estate or otherwise affects the debtor directly. Generally, only
proceedings involving or affecting property of the estate are within
the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. 38 The guiding principle
behind this guideline is that a bankruptcy court should not have core
jurisdiction over any suit that meets the section 157(b) categories only
in a technical sense; its jurisdiction should be limited to matters con-
cerning the debtor and its assets.
Finally, it should be asked whether the defendant has filed a proof
of claim in the case related to the dispute at hand. Under section
157(b)(2)(B), when a defendant (even prior to representation by
counsel) files a claim, the bankruptcy court obtains jurisdiction to rule
on the underlying bases of the claim. 39 Thus, the actions of the defen-
dant can allow the bankruptcy court to take jurisdiction in cases in
which jurisdiction would otherwise be lacking-a situation commonly
referred to as "jurisdiction by ambush."
While the constitutional and statutory inquiries are useful, specific
areas of the law, particularly those that are litigated often, may have
their own tests for determining whether a proceeding is core or non-
core. For example, the extent to which bankruptcy courts have juris-
diction to interpret the terms of pre- and post-petition contracts has
been the subject of a wide disagreement among the circuit courts.40
c. Non-Core Proceedings: Pushing the Limits
28 U.S.C. § 157 gives the bankruptcy courts jurisdiction to hear non-
core but "related to" proceedings, although the bankruptcy court must
send its findings to the district court for entry of a final order or judg-
37. See, e.g., Toledo, 170 F.3d at 1350.
38. See Silva, 185 F.3d at 994-95 (finding that the Trustee did plead that the account to be
turned over was property of the estate with sufficient specificity); In re Gallucci, 931 F.2d 738
(11th Cir. 1991) (holding that property to which the debtor became entitled after the commence-
ment of the case was not property of the estate, and so the bankruptcy court did not have juris-
diction to preside over an action to compel a turnover of the property under section
157(b)(2)(E)).
39. See In re Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (finding that
upon filing by defendant of what amounted to proof of claim in bankruptcy case, bankruptcy
court obtained jurisdiction to determine validity and infringement of patents); In re G.I. Indus-
tries, 204 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that bankruptcy court obtained jurisdic-
tion to interpret contract when creditor filed proof of claim related to contract in bankruptcy
court).
40. For a thorough discussion of the law in this area, especially as it applies to insurance
contracts, see Northwestern, 268 B.R. at 84-92.
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ment unless the parties agree that the bankruptcy court may enter the
final order. Thus, "related to" jurisdiction expresses the outer limit of
both the district courts' and the bankruptcy courts' bankruptcy juris-
diction. The principal case defining that boundary is Pacor, Inc. v.
Higgins,41 which held that "related to" jurisdiction exists if:
the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect
on the estate being administered in bankruptcy .... An action is
related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter the debtor's rights,
liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or nega-
tively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and admin-
istration of the bankruptcy estate.
42
The Supreme Court has approved the reasoning behind the Pacor de-
cision without endorsing the specific test used, although the Supreme
Court also cautioned that bankruptcy court "related to" jurisdiction is
not limitless. 43
Most circuit courts have adopted either the Pacor test or tests simi-
lar to it. 44 In a few recent cases, though, courts have applied stricter
definitions to the question of bankruptcy court non-core jurisdiction.
45
Given the vagueness of the Pacor test, courts must determine on a
case-by-case basis whether a particular matter is "related to" a bank-
ruptcy proceeding. Courts have generally found the following factors
relevant to the determination of whether a bankruptcy court may ex-
ercise non-core jurisdiction over a proceeding: (a) whether the civil
proceeding involves property of the estate or a cause of action which
is property of the estate; (b) whether the civil proceeding will increase
or decrease assets of the estate, or impact administration of the estate;
(c) whether the civil proceeding has issues of fact in common with a
controversy over which the bankruptcy court clearly has jurisdiction
(sometimes placed under the umbrella of "judicial economy"); (d)
whether the estate has disclaimed or abandoned its interest in the civil
proceeding or the subject matter thereof; (e) whether the debtor is a
41. 743 F.2d 984 (3d Cir. 1984),
42. Pacor, 743 F.2d at 994 (emphasis in original).
43. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 (1995) (holding that bankruptcy court had exclu-
sive jurisdiction over determination of whether judgment creditors could execute against
debtor's surety on a supersedeas bond posted by debtor where the judgment that occasioned the
bond had become final).
44. See In re WorldCom, Inc., 2003 WL 716243, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that similar tests
have been adopted in Fifth, Eleventh, Sixth, First, Eight, Fourth, and Second Circuits). Compare
Fedpak Systems, 80 F.3d at 213-14 (noting that Seventh Circuit follows more restrictive test that
states that a case is "related to a bankruptcy when the dispute affects the amount of property for
distribution or the allocation of property among creditors").
45. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 716243 at *6 (discussing and criticizing several recent Third Cir-
cuit decisions that have applied tests stricter than the Pacor test); Fedpack Systems, 80 F.3d at
214 (noting stricter definition of "related to" used in Seventh Circuit).
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real party in interest in the civil proceeding; (f) whether the civil pro-
ceeding is based upon or seeks to enforce or implement a prior order
of another court; (g) whether the civil proceeding was filed in the
bankruptcy court for the convenience of non-debtor parties; (h)
whether the civil proceeding will have "res judicata" or "collateral es-
toppel" effect on or create automatic liability on a claim in the bank-
ruptcy case; (i) whether the civil proceeding is "intertwined with the
bankruptcy case"; and (j) whether the debtor is using the bankruptcy
system merely to gain an advantage in litigation properly belonging to
state courts.46
Issues regarding the extent of the "related to" jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy courts can arise in many contexts. Areas on the fringe of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction include disputes between non-debtor
third parties, disputes over assets or causes of action that are not prop-
erty of the estate, and actions to enjoin lawsuits between third par-
ties. 47 For example, it has been held that the bankruptcy court has
subject matter jurisdiction over interpleader actions to determine the
proper disposition of funds where recovery by claimants against the
funds would reduce claims against the estate, even where the funds
are not property of the estate.48 Similarly, bankruptcy courts have
been held to have jurisdiction over claims by non-debtor plaintiffs
against non-debtor defendants, where the non-debtor defendants in-
tend to bring claims for contribution and indemnification against the
debtor or where the debtor and the non-debtor defendants share joint
insurance.4 9
Actions to enforce or implement prior orders of the bankruptcy
court may also be matters "related to" the bankruptcy proceeding and
therefore within the court's jurisdiction.50 For example, bankruptcy
46. See WorldCom, 2003 WL 716243 at *6-*9 (discussing factors (a), (b), (c), and (i) above);
Fedpak Systems, 80 F.3d at 213-14 (discussing factors (a), (b), and (d) above); Widewaters Rose-
land Center v. The TJX Companies, Inc., 135 B.R. 204, 207 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (discussing factors
(a), (b), and (i) above); 176-60 Union Turnpike, Inc. v. Howard Beach Fitness Center, Inc., 209
B.R. 307, 314 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing factor (j) above).
47. See, e.g., Widewaters Roseland, 135 B.R. at 207 (stating that actions that involve third
parties and that "bind a debtor, involve estate property, or concern the debtor-creditor or inter-
creditor relationships are 'related to' bankruptcy proceedings").
48. See Richard E. Shaw and Associates, Inc. v. De Sante, 2001 WL 790239 (S.D. Cal. 2001)
(transferring interpleader action brought by party unrelated to the debtor to the bankruptcy
court, where recovery by claimants against the fund would relieve the estate of obligations).
49. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 86 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that bankruptcy court
had jurisdiction over claims by tens of thousands of potential tort plaintiffs against debtor and
non-debtors where non-debtors shared insurance with debtor and would seek contribution and
indemnity from debtor).
50. This issue is of particular relevance to the enforcement of Bankruptcy Code section 363
sale orders, which usually purport to sell estate assets "free and clear of all liens, claims, and
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courts have been held to have jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of
a settlement agreement approved by the bankruptcy court even where
those provisions primarily affect third parties. 51 However, judges are
generally reluctant to hear matters easily triable in other courts, pre-
ferring to spend their time and resources on bankruptcy matters.
5. Jurisdiction After Plan Confirmation or Case Closure
Courts agree that a bankruptcy court retains jurisdiction over a case
after the confirmation of a chapter 11 plan of reorganization, but
courts have split over whether that jurisdiction extends to matters be-
yond the implementation of the plan provisions.52 A common mecha-
nism for retaining bankruptcy court jurisdiction after the confirmation
of a plan is the drafting of expansive jurisdiction-retention language
into the text of a plan or a proposed order confirming a plan. How-
ever, some courts have limited the availability of this mechanism. 53
Courts have split over whether a bankruptcy court has jurisdiction
to hear related matters after the closing of a case. 54 Some courts have
encumbrances" and purport to enjoin any actions against the buyer for claims against the debtor.
In a number of cases, a creditor has brought an action against the buyer of estate assets, alleging
liabilities originally incurred by the debtor, on the theory of successor liability. The buyer-de-
fendants have sought relief in the bankruptcy court, arguing that the bankruptcy court should
enforce the injunction in its section 363 sale order. The bankruptcy court is then required to
consider whether it has jurisdiction to enforce the order where the underlying dispute is between
two non-debtors and has little or no bearing on the estate. See, e.g., In re Paris Indus. Corp., 132
B.R. 504, 507-08 (D. Me. 1991); In re Lawrence United Corp., 221 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1998). Courts have in some instances allowed closed bankruptcy cases to be reopened
for the purpose of hearing disputes regarding Section 363 sale orders between nondebtors. See,
e.g., In re Searles, 70 B.R. 266, 274 (D.R.I. 1987); In re Hicks, 184 B.R. 954, 962 (Bankr. C.D.
Cal. 1995). But see In re Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc., 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir. 1994).
51. See In re Wolverine Radio Co., 930 F.2d 1132. 1144-45 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that bank-
ruptcy court possessed jurisdiction to dictate terms under which state agency could rate pur-
chaser of estate property under plan providing that sale was "free and clear of all liens, claims
and interests," but finding against purchaser on the merits).
52. See In re Gordon Sel-Way, Inc., 270 F.3d 280, 288-89 (6th Cir. 2001) (noting disagreement
among courts about scope of bankruptcy courts' post-confirmation jurisdiction); In re U.S. Brass
Corp., 301 F.3d 296. 304 (5th Cir. 2002) (stating that the Fifth Circuit follows the "more exact-
ing" theory, which limits bankruptcy courts' post-confirmation jurisdiction to matters pertaining
to the implementation or execution of the plan).
53. See Local Bankruptcy Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
New Hampshire, LBR 3020-1(a) (containing an exhaustive list of matters for which jurisdiction
may be retained post-confirmation).
54. Compare In re Bass, 171 F.3d 1016 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that bankruptcy court has no
jurisdiction after the closing of the case under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), even if one of the categories
of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) is met), with In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding
exception to general rule that dismissal of a bankruptcy case terminates all adversary proceed-
ings when demanded by fairness and no undue inconvenience involved); Leon v. Couri, 1999 WL
1427724 at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (discussing case law supporting existence of jurisdiction after
dismissal of bankruptcy case, but declining to exercise jurisdiction).
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analogized the non-core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court to "pen-
dent" or "supplemental" jurisdiction in federal district court under 28
U.S.C. § 1367. 55 This analogy has provided some bankruptcy courts
with a rationale for retaining jurisdiction over adversary proceedings
even where the original bankruptcy case has been dismissed, if dismis-
sal of the adversary proceeding would prejudice one of the parties or
violate the interest of judicial economy.5 6
Practically speaking, while judges have discretion to hear or not to
hear post-confirmation and post-closing matters, they generally prefer
to concentrate on ongoing cases and not to become entangled in issues
that may be tried in another court. Often bankruptcy judges refer
metaphorically to post-bankruptcy debtors as "children" who have
"grown up" and must litigate in the "real world," i.e., non-bankruptcy
courts.
6. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code As a Basis for Jurisdiction
The traditional equity powers of the bankruptcy court are codified
in 11 U.S.C. § 105 (commonly called the "All-Writs Statute"). Section
105 does not broaden the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, nor
does it authorize the bankruptcy court to create rights not otherwise
available under applicable law or to fill gaps in the legislation. In-
stead, the bankruptcy court's power under section 105 is limited to
enforcing rights under the Bankruptcy Reform Act through the exer-
cise of equitable powers founded primarily in bankruptcy law itself.57
Accordingly, attempts to use section 105 to provide relief not sup-
ported by the bankruptcy statute have typically failed.58
55. See, e.g., Smith, 866 F.2d at 580.
56. See id. (finding test for retaining of jurisdiction with bankruptcy court after closure of case
to be met where fairness and convenience favored retaining jurisdiction); Leon, 1999 WL, at * 3-
4 (reviewing caselaw and finding that test for retaining of jurisdiction after closure of the under-
lying bankruptcy case was not met). Cf. n. 54 above (noting disagreement of courts on issue of
post-closing jurisdiction).
57. See In re Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc., Docket No. 04-2112-bk, at 12-13 (2d Cir. July
21, 2005); In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Circle Land and Cattle
Corp., 213 B.R. 870, 877 (D. Kan. 1997) (stating that "most bankruptcy cases hold that § 105 is
not a jurisdictional grant" and finding that bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to substantively
consolidate debtor with non-debtor); In re Deltacorp, Inc., 111 B.R. 419, 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990) (explaining that section 105 acts as an aid to jurisdiction, not to confer jurisdiction, because
it does not create substantive rights that do not otherwise exist). See generally Celotex Corp. v.
Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 307-308, 312 (1995) (analyzing limits of section 105 power by examining
grant of jurisdiction in section 1334(b), and noting that discussion of jurisdiction was largely
applicable to discussion of validity of injunction issued under section 105).
58. See Circle Land, 213 B.R. at 876-77 (finding that bankruptcy court had no jurisdiction to
apply doctrine of substantive consolidation to consolidate the assets and liabilities of a non-
debtor with those of the debtor and criticizing contrary cases for taking jurisdiction over a non-
debtor corporation without express statutory authority); In re Fesco Plastics Corp., Inc., 996 F.2d
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Some courts have, however, utilized the authority granted in section
105 or other substantive provisions to devise creative solutions to dif-
ficult problems.59 For example, courts have allowed specific payments
to certain creditors, dubbed "critical vendors," during the course of
reorganization proceedings under section 105 in apparent contraven-
tion of the policy of equal distribution of assets, when doing so was
necessary for the success of the reorganization. 60 Courts have also
cited to 11 U.S.C. § 524(g), a section devoted to asbestos cases, for the
proposition that bankruptcy courts have the authority to set up a trust
into which future, post-bankruptcy asbestos claims must be
channeled.61
B. Venue in the Bankruptcy Courts
There are two principal forms of bankruptcy venue: venue of cases
under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 and venue of proceedings under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1409.62 The term "case" refers to the overall bankruptcy of a
debtor, which is commenced by the filing of a voluntary or involuntary
bankruptcy petition. The term "proceeding" refers to discrete dis-
putes litigated within the context of a bankruptcy case, commenced by
the filing of a motion or a complaint.
152 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that section 105 power may not be exercised to contravene Bank-
ruptcy Code provision or to achieve result not contemplated by Bankruptcy Code in denying
interest on belated distributions to creditors and attorney fees from non-client creditors).
59. Some commentators distinguish between a court's jurisdiction over a matter and its au-
thority to take certain actions in that matter. However, these concepts often merge in the con-
text of section 105.
60. See In re Just for Feet, Inc., 242 B.R. 821, 824-26 (D. Del. 1999) (stating that Supreme
Court has recognized courts' authority to pay pre-petition claims of critical vendors under the
"doctrine of necessity" and authorizing payments); In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 98 B.R. 174,
175-79 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (explaining that courts are authorized to pay pre-petition claims
where necessary to a reorganization under the doctrine of necessity or the "necessity of pay-
ment" rule); In re Synteen Technologies, Inc., 2000 WL 33709667, *2-3 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2000)
(same). But compare In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004) (curtailing bankruptcy
court's authority under the Bankruptcy Code to authorize payments to pre-petition unsecured
creditors under the so-called "critical vendors" application of the doctrine of necessity); In re
Coserv, L.L.C., 273 B.R. 487, 491-502 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (examining historical develop-
ment of doctrine of necessity and stating that resort to that doctrine is appropriate "only under
the most extraordinary circumstances" in partially granting motion for payment of pre-petition
claims).
61. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) was invoked in the Johns Manville bankruptcy in order to
direct anticipated asbestos claims to a channeling trust. For a discussion of this case and the use
of § 105 as a basis for jurisdiction generally, see Peter E. Meltzer, Getting Out of Jail Free: Can
the Bankruptcy Plan Process Be Used to Release Nondebtor Parties, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (Win-
ter 1997).
62. A third kind exists for cases ancillary to foreign proceedings, but is too rare to merit
discussion in this context.
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A debtor can commence a case only in the district in which he, she,
or it is domiciled, resides, has its principal place of business, or holds
its principal assets, in each case for the 180 days preceding the filing or
the longer period thereof-or a district where a case of an affiliated
debtor is pending. Thus, if the debtor resides in the Southern District
of New York for 89 of the 180 days prior to filing, but in the Eastern
District of Massachusetts for 91 of the 180 days prior to filing, the
Eastern District of Massachusetts would be the appropriate venue.63
Whether a debtor is domiciled in a state is a question often involving
the interpretation of state law.64
The proper venue for a case is seldom difficult to determine, unless
the debtor has its principal place of business in one district, its princi-
pal assets in another, and its domicile in a third. 65 The location of the
debtor's "nerve center" may be an important factor in determining
proper venue for a manufacturing operation. 66 The location of the
debtor's assets may be a more significant factor in a real estate case.67
Some cases are commenced in improbable venues due to the "affili-
ated debtor" rule. For example, the Eastern Air Lines bankruptcy
was adjudicated in the Southern District of New York because one of
Eastern's minor affiliates, Ionosphere Clubs, a New York corporation,
first filed its bankruptcy petition in that venue. More recently, the
chapter 11 cases of Enron and all of its affiliates were filed in the
Southern District of New York because an affiliate, a New York cor-
poration, first filed its petition in that venue. This rule clearly permits
the "tail to wag the dog" and encourages multi-state conglomerates to
consider carefully the venue in which they would like their cases to
proceed. Practically, this rule streamlines the bankruptcy process by
allowing all affiliates to have their cases heard before a single court.
Many business bankruptcies are filed in Delaware because that is
the state of the debtor's business organization. A Delaware corpora-
tion with a chief executive office in Massachusetts will have at least
63. An individual debtor may have only one residence, even if he has multiple homes. See In
re Handel, 253 B.R. 308, 311 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000).
64. See In re Segno Communications, Inc., 264 B.R. 501, 508 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding
that dissolved Illinois corporation remained domiciled in Illinois following the effective date of
its dissolution, based upon Illinois "winding up" statute).
65. See, e.g. In re Bell Tower Associates, Ltd., 86 B.R. 795 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1988) (venue
proper in Texas, where primary physical asset was located and controlled, even though general
partner kept records in New York and majority of partners lived in New York).
66. See In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 188 B.R. 815, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1995); In re Common-
wealth Oil Refining Co., Inc., 596 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980).
67. See In re Bell Tower Assocs., Ltd., 86 B.R. at 795. But see In re Monterey Equities - Hill-
side, 73 B.R. 749, 753 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1987) (proper venue existed at location of partnership's
principal place of business even though primary assets were located in other states).
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two choices for the venue of its bankruptcy case, and it may prefer one
venue over the other based on substantive differences between First
Circuit and Third Circuit law.
Standing to challenge the venue of a bankruptcy case is broadly
granted and is possessed by defendants in adversary proceedings
brought by debtors.68 Parties may waive their rights to challenge
venue if they do not raise the issue in a timely manner.69 Bankruptcy
courts have no discretion to retain cases that have been filed in an
improper venue. 70 However, improper venue often goes unchal-
lenged and those cases remain where they were first filed.
Generally, venue for proceedings related to a bankruptcy case is
proper in the district in which the case is pending.71 A trustee may,
however, commence a proceeding to recover a money judgment of
less than $1000, a consumer debt of less than $15,000, or a non-con-
sumer debt against a non-insider of less than $10,000, only in the dis-
trict where the defendant resides. 72 Additional qualifications to the
general rule are set forth at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1409(c) through (e). 7 3
A case or proceeding may be transferred from one district to an-
other either (a) "in the interest of justice" or (b) "for the convenience
of the parties. '74 Under Bankruptcy Rule 1014, such orders may be
entered by the bankruptcy court. If more than one petition is filed for
the same or affiliated debtors in different districts, the Bankruptcy
Rules make clear that a motion for transfer of venue must be filed in
the district in which the petition filed first is pending. For removed
actions, motions to transfer venue should be heard before motions for
remand, and, if venue is transferred, the court in the new venue is the
appropriate court to hear the remand action.75
There has been some dispute as to whether transfer of venue for
adversary proceedings related to bankruptcy cases is governed by 28
68. See Peachtree Lane, 188 B.R. at 826.
69. See In re The Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 259 B.R. 243, 248 (N.D.N.Y. 2001); In the
Matter of the Sports Club at Illinois Center, 132 B.R. 792, 800 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (holding
challenge filed one week after bankruptcy petitions were filed was timely).
70. See Peachtree Lane, 188 B.R. at 831.
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(a).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1409(b).
73. For example, section 1409(d) provides that a bankruptcy trustee may commence an action
arising after a bankruptcy filing only in a venue where that action could have been commenced
under nonbankruptcy venue provisions. This section has been interpreted as an exception to the
"home court presumption" discussed in more detail below. See In re Eagle-Picher Industries,
Inc., 162 B.R. 140, 142 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1993).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(2). See In re Vital Link Lodi, Inc., 240 B.R. 15, 19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1999).
75. See In re Santa Clara County Child Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40, 49 (1st Cir. B.A.P.
1998).
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U.S.C. § 1412, the bankruptcy-specific venue transfer statute, or by 28
U.S.C. § 1404, the venue transfer statute generally applicable to fed-
eral cases. 76 The difference will in most cases be immaterial, because
the factors considered under each statute are similar,77 but section
1412 may allow more flexibility in venue transfer where the action
would not have been properly brought in the new venue but for the
pendency of the bankruptcy case in that new venue. In particular,
section 1412 carries a judicially-created "home court presumption"
that the bankruptcy court in which the debtor's case is pending is the
proper venue for all proceedings related to the case, including state
court proceedings removed to federal courts in sister districts.78 Al-
though the "home court presumption" is subject to the section
1409(d) exception for postpetition actions, section 1404 effectively
places the section 1409(d) limitation on all prepetition and postpeti-
tion actions.
One court has held that section 1404 applies only to improperly
venued cases, while section 1412 applies to "cases where venue is ap-
propriate in the first instance, but transfer is appropriate 'in the inter-
est of justice or for the convenience of the parties." 79 The court in
Columbia Western also held that transfer of the case to a proper
venue, not dismissal of the case, was the appropriate remedy under 28
U.S.C. § 1406, which permits either transfer or dismissal.
Opportunity for interlocutory review of venue transfer is quite lim-
ited: "It is a well-established rule in this circuit (and generally) that
[district court] 'orders transferring venue are not immediately appeal-
able."' 80 Mandamus relief may be available, although its nature is
"more circumscribed than review by appeal. ' 81
76. See Searcy v. Knostman, 155 B.R. 699, 706 (S.D. Miss. 1993) (citing cases on both sides of
the issue); In re Harnischfeger Indus., Inc., 246 B.R. 421, 434-35 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2000).
77. Some section 1404 factors are as follows: location of counsel, location of books and
records, ease of access to proof, where the case can be tried expeditiously and inexpensively, the
cost of obtaining attendance of witnesses and other trial expenses, the place of the alleged
wrong, the possibility of delay and prejudice if transfer is granted, and the plaintiff's choice of
forum (which is a "very influential" factor). See Searcy, 155 B.R. at 707-08. Some section 1412
"interest of justice" factors are as follows: economics of estate administration, presumption in
favor of the "home court," judicial efficiency, ability to receive a fair trial, the state's interest in
having local controversies decided within its borders by those familiar with its laws, enforceabil-
ity of any judgment rendered, and plaintiff's choice of forum. See Harnischfeger, 246 B.R. at 435-
37. Section 1412 "convenience of the parties" factors include the following: location of the plain-
tiff and defendant, ease of access to necessary proof, availability of subpoena power for unwill-
ing witnesses, and expenses related to obtaining witnesses. See id. at 437.
78. See Harnischfeger, 246 B.R. at 439.
79. In re Columbia Western, Inc., 183 B.R. 660, 665 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1995).




C. Removal of State Court Actions to the Bankruptcy Courts
One method for a suit to enter bankruptcy court is through a re-
moval of that proceeding from the state court where it originated. It
should be noted that state court actions generally may not be com-
menced or continued against a bankruptcy debtor due to the broad
"automatic stay" contained in section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code.
However, the bankruptcy courts may have concurrent jurisdiction
over some state court actions against parties other than the debtor,
8 2
state court actions in which the debtor is the plaintiff, and state court
actions for which the bankruptcy court has lifted the automatic stay.
Bankruptcy courts are likely to hear state court actions over which
they have concurrent jurisdiction in the interest of litigating all mat-
ters relating to the debtor in a single forum.
The removal of state court actions related to bankruptcy cases is
governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1452(a). That section states that, with the
exception of proceedings before the United States Tax Court and ac-
tions by governmental units to enforce regulatory or police powers,
any civil action may be removed to the district court as long as it fits
within the jurisdictional parameters of 28 U.S.C. § 1334, in other
words, as long as it is least "related to" a bankruptcy case. The proce-
dural requirements for removal, including the time within which a no-
tice of removal must be filed, are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9027.
Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(1) refers to filing the notice of removal
"with the clerk for the district and division" in which the removed
action is pending. A number of courts have held that in light of the
definition of "clerk" in Bankruptcy Rule 9001(3), the reference to the
"clerk" in Bankruptcy Rule 9027(a)(1) means the bankruptcy clerk's
office, unless the bankruptcy and district court clerks have been
merged into one.8 3 The notice of removal must contain (a) a signed
statement of the facts warranting removal and (b) a statement of
whether the proceeding upon removal of the claim will be core or
non-core and, if non-core, whether the party filing the notice consents
to entry of final orders by the bankruptcy judge. Any party that has
filed a pleading in connection with the removed action, other than the
party filing the notice of removal, must file a statement admitting or
denying the allegation in the notice as to whether the proceeding is
non-core. If the statement admits that the proceeding is non-core,
Bankruptcy Rule 9027(e)(3) requires that the statement provide
82. It remains an open question whether an action against a party other than the debtor could
be sufficiently related to a debtor's case to confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court, but
would not so effect the debtor as to be barred by the automatic stay.
83. See In re Aztec Indus., Inc., 84 B.R. 464, 468 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
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whether the party consents to the entry of final orders by the bank-
ruptcy judge. Removal is effective upon the filing of a copy of the
removal notice with the clerk of the court from which the action is
removed and requires no judicial action. A challenge to removal is
styled as a motion to remand.84
Bankruptcy Rules 9027(a)(2) and (a)(3) contain the deadlines for
filing notices of removal where the civil action to be removed was
initiated before the commencement of the bankruptcy case (generally
ninety days after the bankruptcy filing) and where the civil action to
be removed was initiated after the commencement of the bankruptcy
case (generally thirty days after receipt of notice of the civil action).
In the nonbankruptcy context, removal of state court actions to fed-
eral courts is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1441. Under that statute, it is
clear that the consensual joinder of all defendants is required for re-
moval.85 Some courts have held that this rule, often called the "Rule
of Unanimity," also applies to bankruptcy removal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1452.86 However, other courts have held that neither the section
1452 statute nor its context extends the Rule of Unanimity to bank-
ruptcy removal. 87
A state court action must be removed to the federal district court in
the state where the state court action is pending, and from there it
may be referred to the bankruptcy court in that district. In order to
transfer a case which has been removed to one federal district to a
district (or bankruptcy) court in another federal district, a motion to
transfer venue pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 must be filed with the
court to which the proceeding has been removed. Transfer of venue,
both generally and in the specific case of removal, is discussed in de-
tail in Section II.B. above.
D. Intervention in the Bankruptcy Courts
A party in interest could also enter a bankruptcy court through in-
tervention in a pending action. Intervention in bankruptcy actions
may occur either through Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a) (permissive inter-
vention) or through Federal Rule 24 (permissive intervention or inter-
84. See In re Santa Clara County Child Care Consortium, 223 B.R. 40, 43 (1st Cir. B.A.P.
1998).
85. See Retirement Systems of Alabama v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262
(M.D. Ala. 2002).
86. See Ross v. Thousand Adventures of Iowa, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 2d 996 (S.D. Iowa 2001)
(stating that this is the majority rule and citing cases on both sides of the issue).
87. See In re WorldCom Securities Litigation, 2003 WL 716243 at *18 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); In re
Mid-Atlantic Resources Corp., 283 B.R. 176, 183 (S.D. W. Va. 2002) (stating that the Rule of
Unanimity does not apply to bankruptcy actions in the Fourth Circuit).
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vention as of right). Some confusion has resulted from the overlap in
these intervention mechanisms.
1. Bankruptcy Rule 2018 and Bankruptcy Code Section 1109(b)
Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a) provides that the court may grant permis-
sive intervention to any "interested entity," generally or with regard
to any specified matter, "for cause shown." In making their decisions,
courts have cited "whether intervention would result in undue delay
or prejudice" and "whether the proposed intervenor's interests are ad-
equately protected by a party already present in the case" as questions
relevant to the Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a) analysis.88 These factors are
similar to, and presumably derived from, Federal Rule 24(b) and re-
lated case law (discussed below).
The remainder of Bankruptcy Rule 2018 provides special rules for
intervention by attorneys general of states, the Secretary of the Trea-
sury of the United States, and labor unions. In addition, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2403 governs intervention by the Attorney General of the United
States and the attorneys general of the states in particular circum-
stances, and section 307 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the United
States Trustee to intervene in all bankruptcy proceedings.8 9
As to the issue of standing to intervene as an "interested entity"
under Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a), section 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides as follows:
A party in interest, including the debtor, the trustee, a creditors'
committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an eq-
uity security holder, or any indenture trustee, may raise and may
appear and be heard on any issue in a case under [chapter 11].
Neither "interested entity" nor "party in interest" is defined by the
Bankruptcy Code. "The term 'party in interest' is broadly interpreted,
but not infinitely expansive." 90 In rulings on motions to intervene,
courts construe the term "party in interest" to allow intervention
where possible.
Because of its breadth, section 1109(b) could be read in conjunction
with Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a) to confer an absolute right of interven-
tion on all "parties in interest" in both adversary proceedings and con-
tested matters in chapter 11 cases. However, some courts have held
that Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a) and section 1109(b) do not grant an
88. See Southern Boulevard, Inc. v. Martin Paint Stores, 207 B.R. 57, 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
89. See In re Donovan Corp., 215 F.3d 929, 930 (9th Cir. 2000).
90. Southern Boulevard, 207 B.R. at 61 (holding that subtenant of debtor's lessee is not a
party in interest because it is too remote from the debtor and is analogous to a creditor of a
debtor's creditor).
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unlimited right of intervention to all "parties in interests" in adversary
proceedings in chapter 11 cases. Instead, these courts have held that
the more limited Federal Rule 24 applies to all adversary proceedings
and that the constitutional standing requirements must be satisfied in
all cases of intervention.91
2. Federal Rule 24 and Bankruptcy Rule 7024
Federal Rule 24, made applicable in adversary proceedings through
Bankruptcy Rule 7024 (and, at the court's discretion, in contested
matters through Bankruptcy Rules 9014 and 7024), provides for both
intervention as of right and permissive intervention. Federal Rule
24(a) provides that a party shall be allowed to intervene in a proceed-
ing as of right if either of two conditions are met. Under Federal Rule
24(a)(1), a party has a right to intervene where a federal statute con-
fers on that party an unconditional right to intervene. 92 Under Fed-
eral Rule 24(a)(2), a party has a right to intervene when that party:
claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposi-
tion of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the
applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's in-
terest is adequately represented by existing parties.
Under Federal Rule 24(b), permissive intervention, an intervenor
must also meet one of two requirements. First, under Federal Rule
24(b)(1), the court may allow a party to intervene where a federal
statute grants that party a conditional right to intervene. Second,
under Federal Rule 24(b)(2), the court may allow a party to intervene
where that party's "claim or defense and the main action have ques-
tions of law or fact in common." Federal Rule 24(b)(2) also states
that "[i]n exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties."
91. See Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling v. Gulf Oil Corp., 762 F.2d 1283, 1287 (5th Cir. 1985)
(holding that scope of section 1109 is limited by Federal Rule 24); In re Newcare Health Corp.,
244 B.R. 167, 170-72 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000) (holding that constitutional, prudential standing re-
quirements apply without regard to Section 1109(b) and Bankruptcy Rule 2018(a)); In re Char-
ter Co., 50 B.R. 57, 61 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that Bankruptcy Rule 2018 and section
1109 apply only in contested matters and that Bankruptcy Rule 7024 and Federal Rule 24 apply
in adversary proceedings).
92. It seems possible, under an argument similar to that raised in the Newcare case, that sec-
tion 1109 of the Bankruptcy Code could satisfy Federal Rule 24(a)(1) or (b)(1). However, under
the Newcare decision's rationale, this "bootstrapping" argument would likely fail for the same
constitutional reason set forth in that decision.
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a. Intervention as of Right
Federal Rule 24(a)(2) sets forth a four-fold test for intervention as
of right where no federal statute is involved: intervention will be al-
lowed where (1) the applicant submits a timely motion to intervene;
(2) the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transac-
tion which is the subject of the action; (3) the applicant is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest; and (4) the ap-
plicant's interest is inadequately represented by existing parties.
93
The requirements of Federal Rule 24(a)(2) are strictly construed in
order to preserve the smooth workings of the bankruptcy process.
94
Factors considered in determining whether a motion to intervene is
timely include: (1) the stage of the proceedings; (2) the proffered pur-
pose of the intervention; (3) the length of time preceding the applica-
tion during which the applicants knew or should have known of their
interest in the case; (4) the potential prejudice to the existing parties
attributable to the applicant's delay; and (5) the existence of unusual
or mitigating circumstances.
95
Factors considered in determining whether an applicant's interests
are inadequately represented by existing parties include the following:
(1) whether the interests of the existing parties are such that it will
make all of the applicant's arguments duplicative; (2) whether the ex-
isting parties are capable and willing to make all such arguments; and
(3) whether the applicant would offer a necessary element to the pro-
ceedings that the existing parties would neglect.
96
b. Permissive Intervention
In spite of the fact that intervention as of right under Federal Rule
24(a) is limited, the courts liberally construe Federal Rule 24(b) to
allow permissive intervention in a variety of circumstances, where no
significant harm results to the proceeding or its litigants.
97
93. See In the Matter of Richman, 104 F.3d 654, 659 (4th Cir. 1997); In re Bernal, 223 B.R.
542, 547 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 1998).
94. See In re George Rodman, Inc., 33 B.R. 348, 350 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1983) (denying com-
mittee intervention where its interests were already represented by trustee); In re Charter Co.,
50 B.R. 57, 62-63 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that the requirement that interests are not
adequately protected should be strictly construed and should be measured at time of expected
intervention).
95. See In re Troutman Enterprises, Inc., 286 F.3d 359, 365 (6th Cir. 2002); Bridge v. Air
Quality Technical Services, Inc., 194 F.R.D. 3, 8 (D. Me. 1999).
96. See Bernal, 223 B.R. at 547.
97. See United States v. Colvin, 203 B.R. 930, 941 (N.D. Tex. 1996) ("Permissive intervention
is entirely discretionary with the trial court."); In re Charter Co., 50 B.R. 57, 62-63 (Bankr. W.D.
20051
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The "no undue delay" requirement for permissive intervention im-
pliedly incorporates the timeliness requirement discussed in greater
detail in the Federal Rule 24(a) jurisprudence. 98
3. Conditions on Intervention
The court has the discretion to condition both mandatory and per-
missive intervention and to limit the scope of intervention to particu-
lar matters or to particular' issues.99
III. LITIGATING IN BANKRUPTCY COURT
A. Adversary Proceedings and Contested Matters
Actions are commenced in the bankruptcy court in one of two clas-
ses: adversary proceedings and contested matters. Bankruptcy Rule
7001 contains an exhaustive list of ten categories of adversary pro-
ceedings. Actions not within these ten categories are contested mat-
ters under Bankruptcy Rule 9014. Practically, pleadings in contested
matters are typically filed on the bankruptcy docket, whereas a new
and distinct case docket is created for pleadings in adversary proceed-
ings. Captions on pleadings in adversary proceedings contain refer-
ences to both the main bankruptcy case and the adversary proceeding.
Typically, the same judge presiding over the main bankruptcy case will
also preside over both contested matters and adversary proceedings
related to the main case.
The ten categories of adversary proceedings set forth in Bankruptcy
Rule 7001 are, in brief, the following: (1) proceedings to recover
money or property; (2) proceedings to determine the validity, priority,
or extent of a lien; (3) proceedings to obtain approval for the sale of
the interests of both the estate and a co-owner in property; (4) pro-
ceedings to object to or revoke a discharge; (5) proceedings to revoke
an order confirming a plan or reorganization; (6) proceedings to de-
termine the dischargeability of a debt; (7) proceedings to obtain in-
junctions or other equitable relief; (8) proceedings to subordinate
allowed claims or interests; (9) proceedings to obtain declaratory
Tex. 1985) (holding that discretion under Federal Rule 24(b)(2) should be liberally construed);
In re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
98. See Colvin, 203 B.R. at 941.
99. See In re Charter Co., 50 B.R. 57, 62-63 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that court can
limit extent of intervention to particular issues); Southern v. Plumb Tools, 696 F.2d 1321 (11th
Cir. 1983) (holding in non-bankruptcy matter that intervention was conditioned on imposition of
state law restrictions on evidence regarding plaintiff's having received worker's compensation
payments); In re Public Service Company of New Hampshire, 88 B.R. 546, 551 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1988) (allowing New Hampshire Office of the Consumer Advocate to intervene only to advise
court on effect of rate setting).
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judgments with respect to items (1) through (8); and (10) proceedings
to determine causes of action removed under 29 U.S.C. §1452.
Adversary proceedings are governed by Part VII of the Bankruptcy
Rules, which incorporate many of the Federal Rules, with some nota-
ble exceptions. In general, the Bankruptcy Rules and the Federal
Rules together set the procedural guidelines for, inter alia, commence-
ment of adversary proceedings, service of process, service of subse-
quent pleadings, forms and general rules of pleadings, defenses and
objections, counterclaims and cross-claims, third-party practice, pre-
trial procedure, necessary and permissive joinder, interpleader, class
actions, intervention, substitution of parties, discovery, dismissal, de-
fault, summary judgment, stays, injunction, and execution.
Adversary proceedings are commenced by the filing of complaints
and are often referred to as "full blown federal lawsuits within the
larger bankruptcy case."' 1 ° Although adversary proceedings can re-
sult in the same lengthy litigation found outside of bankruptcy, the
Bankruptcy Rules attempt to accelerate the pace of adversary pro-
ceedings. Service of process is somewhat more flexible in adversary
proceedings than in ordinary federal actions, and the discovery period
in adversary proceedings, although subject to the same rules as in or-
dinary federal actions, is often compressed by bankruptcy courts.
Contested matters are defined by negation to include all actions in
bankruptcy that are not adversary proceedings. 10 1 Contested matters
are commenced by the filing of motions and are generally governed by
Part IX of the Bankruptcy Rules. However, Bankruptcy Rule 9014
makes many of the Bankruptcy Rules applicable to adversary pro-
ceedings also applicable to contested matters, including rules regard-
ing service, discovery, dismissal, summary judgment, and execution.
Certain borderline actions challenge the distinction between adver-
sary proceedings and contested matters. For example, although relief
from the automatic stay is properly sought through a contested matter
(see Bankruptcy Rule 4001(a)(1)), reconsideration of a decision to
grant relief from the automatic stay could be viewed as an adversary
proceeding to obtain a new injunction. 10 2 Similarly, an action to es-
tablish cure amounts for a debtor's assumption of executory contracts,
100. In the Matter of Transamerican Natural Gas Corp., 978 F.2d 1409, 1416 (5th Cir. 1992).
101. The Bankruptcy Rules specify that certain actions shall be commenced as contested mat-
ters. These include actions by creditors to obtain relief from stay (see Bankruptcy Rule
4001(a)(1)), actions by debtors-in-possession to use cash collateral (see Bankruptcy Rule
4001(b)(1)), and actions by debtors-in-possession to assume, reject, or assign executory contracts
and unexpired leases (see Bankruptcy Rule 6006(a)).
102. See In re Gledhill, 76 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting this analysis and finding
Federal Rule 60(b) action properly commenced by motion).
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where the action seeks quasi-equitable relief related to the cure
amount, is arguably within the bounds of Bankruptcy Rule 7001(7).103
As a result of the overlap in governing rules, the separation of ad-
versary proceedings from contested matters may appear to be a dis-
tinction without a difference. However, parties initiating actions in
the bankruptcy court often find contested matters more easily initi-
ated and more flexibly pursued.
Indeed, the procedural differences between contested matters and
adversary proceedings may have important substantive results. For
example, in In re Iannachino, the Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit held that an application for payment of fees to a debtor's attor-
neys was properly brought by motion in a contested matter.10 4 Had
the action been properly brought as an adversary proceeding, compul-
sory counterclaims for the attorney's malpractice would have been
waived, because they had not been asserted in a timely fashion. In-
stead, since the action was a contested matter, the counterclaims were
preserved, without regard to their timeliness.
Still, most courts do not allow the technical differences between
contested matters and adversary proceedings to determine the out-
come of an action, so long as due process concerns are not impli-
cated. 10 5 Courts in Massachusetts have generally agreed with this
approach. 10 6 To complicate matters even more, a response or objec-
tion to a contested matter (i.e., to a motion) may raise issues properly
pursued only by adversary proceeding, although courts may permit
the parties to continue under the contested matter rules, especially if
no due process concerns exist.
103. See In re O'Brien Environmental Energy, Inc., 188 F.3d 116, 123 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
this argument and finding contested matter more appropriate than adversary proceeding).
104. 242 F.3d 36, 42 (1st Cir. 2001),
105. See In re Orfa Corp. of Philadelphia. 170 B.R. 257, 275 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (citing In re
Command Services Corp., 102 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989), for a long string of sup-
porting cases); In re Munoz, 287 B.R. 546, 551 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002).
106. See Rails v. Docktor Pet Centers, Inc., 177 B.R. 420, 429 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that
bankruptcy court's decision to treat action for monetary damages and injunctive relief, more
properly pursued as an adversary proceeding, as a contested matter was harmless error, because
it was not prejudicial to the adverse party); In re Pagan, 282 B.R. 735, 741-42 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2002) (holding that untimely adversary proceeding could relate back to timely contested matter,
even where action should have been commenced by complaint as an adversary proceeding
within the time required). See also In re Stacy, 99 B.R. 142 (D. Mass. 1989); In re Commonwealth
Mortgage Co., Inc., 45 B.R. 368 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992). But see In re Markus, 313 F.3d 1146,




B. Discovery in the Bankruptcy Courts
1. Discovery in Adversary Proceedings and Contested Matters
As a general matter, discovery conducted after the commencement
of an adversary proceeding or contested matter in bankruptcy court is
governed by the same rules as discovery in federal district court.
Bankruptcy Rules 7026 through 7037 incorporate by reference Fed-
eral Rules 26 through 37, without modification. However, the Local
Bankruptcy Rules in certain jurisdictions contain modifications to the
Bankruptcy Rules regarding discovery.
2. Discovery Outside Adversary Proceedings and
Contested Matters
Fact-gathering in bankruptcy is not limited to formal discovery. The
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules permit two types of examina-
tions even in the absence of (and in some cases, as noted below, only
in the absence of) pending litigation.
First, under 11 U.S.C. § 343, the debtor is required to submit to ex-
amination by parties in interest, under oath, at the meeting of credi-
tors held pursuant to section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. This
meeting gives creditors an opportunity to question the debtor on a
broad array of topics relevant to the bankruptcy. Although section
341 meetings are typically short in duration, there is no limit in the
statute on the breadth of questioning nor on the duration of the
meeting.10 7
Second, Bankruptcy Rule 2004 provides that on motion of any party
in interest the court may order the examination of any entity (a "Rule
2004 Examination"). Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004(b), the scope of
the examination is limited to the "acts, conduct, or property or to the
liabilities and financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which
may affect the administration of the debtor's estate, or to the debtor's
right to a discharge." In a chapter 11 or chapter 13 bankruptcy case,
the examination may also "relate to the operation of any business and
the desirability of its continuance, the source of any money or prop-
erty acquired or to be acquired by the debtor for purposes of consum-
mating a plan and the consideration given or offered therefore, and
any other matter relevant to the case or to the formulation of a plan."
As a consequence, "[t]he scope of a Rule 2004 examination is ex-
107. For a discussion of section 343 examinations as compared to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 ex-
aminations, see In re Nixon Electric Supply, Inc., 85 B.R. 988 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988). See also
In re Muy Bueno Corp., 257 B.R. 843, 850-52 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
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tremely broad and has often been likened to a lawful 'fishing
expedition. '1 l0 8
Under Bankruptcy Rule 2004(c), attendance at a Rule 2004 Exami-
nation may be compelled by subpoena under Bankruptcy Rule 9016.
In addition, Bankruptcy Rule 2005 provides for apprehension of the
debtor in another district if necessary to compel attendance at a Rule
2004 Examination. For the purposes of these rules, the Bankruptcy
Rule 9001(5) definition of "debtor" includes officers, board members,
controlling stockholders, and members of a corporate debtor.
Much of the litigation regarding the use of Rule 2004 Examinations
has arisen in the context of adversary proceedings and concerns the
conflict between the Federal Rules regarding discovery, as incorpo-
rated in Part VII of the Bankruptcy Rules, and Bankruptcy Rule 2004.
Courts have noted some of the differences between less restrictive
Rule 2004 Examinations and depositions under the Federal Rules.
For example, a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examinee is not automatically
entitled to the right to counsel, nor to the right to object to immaterial
or improper questions posed, even though the Rule 2004 Examination
testimony may be used as evidence in later-filed adversary proceed-
ings.109 There is no general right of cross-examination in Rule 2004
Examinations, and examinees do not have the right to have the issues
to be addressed in the examination set forth prior to the
examination." 0
One rule that has emerged in some jurisdictions prohibits the use of
Rule 2004 Examinations when litigation is already pending on the
subject matter of the examination, on the theory that the more protec-
tive Federal Rules should then govern. 1 ' Other courts, however,
have held that the fact that litigation is pending between the parties is
not relevant to the decision of the court to allow a Rule 2004
Examination. 1 2
Despite the apparent breadth of Rule 2004 Examinations, courts
have curtailed the information-gathering technique for a number of
108. In re Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 208 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
109. See In re McLaren, 158 B.R. 655, 658 (N.D. Ohio 1992); In re The Bennett Funding
Group, 203 B.R. 24, 28 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996).
110. See In re Enron Corp., 281 B.R. 836, 841 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002).
111. See, e.g., In re 2435 Plainfield Avenue, Inc., 223 B.R. 440, 456 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); Ben-
nett Funding, 203 B.R. at 29 (distinguishing between discovery related to the pending litigation
and discovery not related to the pending litigation, but holding that the inability to separate the
two categories in the instant case mandates compliance with the Federal Rules).
112. See, e.g., In re International Fibercom, Inc., 283 B.R. 290, 293 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002); In
re Table Talk, Inc., 51 B.R. 143 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (holding, however, that the objecting
party may raise relevance and admissibility objections to Rule 2004 Examination testimony at
trial, because those objections could not be raised during the examination).
[Vol. 3:383
BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION
equitable reasons. For example, courts have held that a party seeking
a Rule 2004 Examination must demonstrate "good cause" for the ex-
amination and that the cost and disruption to the examinee must be
outweighed by the benefits to the examiner. 113 "Good cause" re-
quires a showing that the examination is necessary to establish the
claims that the examiner may allege or that the denial of the request
for the examination would cause the examiner undue hardship or in-
justice.114 Courts have denied requests for Rule 2004 Examinations
by the proponents of competing plans of reorganization that were at-
tempting to gain an unfair advantage in the bankruptcy case.115
Courts have stated that Rule 2004 Examinations may not be used to
harass, annoy, embarrass, or oppress the examinee, and that the scope
of Rule 2004 Examinations may be limited accordingly. 116 In accor-
dance with the "pending litigation" rule, courts have stated that Rule
2004 Examinations cannot be used to obtain information otherwise
undiscoverable. 117
In addition, where necessary to preventive disruption of the reor-
ganization process, the court may limit the scope of the Rule 2004
Examination. 1 8
To the extent that a deponent or provider of documents subject to a
document request under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 would have a privi-
lege or right to avoid testimony under applicable law, such privilege or
right will apply in connection with Rule 2004 Examinations. 1 9 At-
tempts to assert fourth and sixth amendment rights to prevent Rule
2004 Examinations have failed.' 20
Some courts have considered whether Rule 2004 Examination testi-
mony is subject to public access or may be concealed from the public
113. See In re Express One Int'l, Inc., 217 B.R. 215, 217 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1998).
114. See id.
115. See In re Duratech Industries, Inc., 241 B.R. 283, 290 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), affg 241 B.R. 291,
296-98 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1999).
116. See In re Strecker, 251 B.R. 878, 882-83 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000).
117. See Enron, 281 B.R. at 842. See also In re Martin, 208 B.R. 807, 810 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(denying Rule 2004 Examination request when examiner's potential claims are barred by res
judicata).
118. See In re Texaco, Inc., 79 B.R. 551, 553 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987) (court limited scope of
document request so as to lessen burden on debtor); In re Public Service Co. of New Hampshire,
91 B.R. 198 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988).
119. See In re Symington, 209 B.R. 678, 687 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In re Standard Financial
Mgmt. Corp., 76 B.R. 864, 865 (D. Mass. 1987) (holding that examinee may exert fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination in Rule 2004 Examination); In re Walsh Trucking Co.,
Inc., 67 B.R. 863 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (holding that fifth amendment analysis applies). But see
In re Kroh, 80 B.R. 488, 489 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1987) (holding that no accountant/client privilege
exists under federal law).
120. See In re Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 211-12 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000).
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by a protective order. The generally public nature of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, and the multiplicity of parties potentially interested in the
testimony, influences this analysis. 121
C. Settlements in the Bankruptcy Courts
Settlements are especially favored by bankruptcy courts because of
the multiplicity of interests in a bankruptcy case and the inherent diffi-
culty of resolving those interests through litigation alone. 122 Yet, for
these same reasons, a bankruptcy court must review settlements and
make specific factual findings to ensure that a compromise of one
party's interests does not impermissibly infringe upon the interests of
the estate or of an entity that is not a party to the settlement.1 23
Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a) provides that the court may approve a
compromise or settlement. Bankruptcy Rule 2002(a)(3) provides that
the moving party must provide parties in interest with twenty days
notice of a hearing on the compromise or settlement, unless that time
is reduced by the court pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(c)(1). "The
decision to approve a given compromise lies within the discretion of
the trial court. ' 124 The decision of a bankruptcy court to approve a
compromise or settlement is subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion.1 25
The touchstone for approval of settlements is whether the settle-
ments are "fair and equitable" and "in the best interests of the es-
tate. 1' 26 Factors considered in evaluating these general standards are
as follows: (1) the probable success of the underlying litigation on the
merits; (2) the potential difficulty in collecting on a judgment; (3) the
121. See, e.g., In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 156 B.R. 414, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that
public access under section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code applies only to documents filed with the
court and not to unfiled Rule 2004 Examination testimony); Symington, 209 B.R. at 694 (holding
that right to public access outweighs privacy rights of debtor that would be preserved if protec-
tive order were entered).
122. There is a minority view that there is no requirement that settlements be approved by the
bankruptcy court. See In re Telephone Communications, Inc., 179 B.R. 544, 551 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
However, the enforceability at a settlement that has not been approved is questionable at best,
which counsels seeking approval.
123. In re Mavrode, 205 B.R. 716, 719 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1997) ("Settlements are generally fa-
vored in bankruptcy proceedings, in that they provide for an often needed and efficient resolu-
tion of the bankruptcy case.").
124. In re GF Corp., 120 B.R. 421, 425 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
125. See In re Emerald Oil Co., 807 F.2d 1234, 1239 (5th Cir. 1987).
126. See In re Armstrong, 285 B.R 344 (table), 2002 WL 471332 at *2 (9th Cir. B.A.P. 2002).
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complexity and expense of the litigation; and (4) the paramount inter-
est of the creditors.127
Courts have alternately phrased the approval of settlements as an
economic balance between the value of the claim being compromised
and the value of the compromise proposal. 128 Included in this analysis
are the "expenses and burdens associated with sharply contested and
dubious claims. '129
The Supreme Court in Anderson stated that, for a bankruptcy
court's approval of a settlement to be upheld on appeal, the bank-
ruptcy court must have reviewed "all facts necessary for an intelligent
and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate success should
the claim be litigated.' 30 The bankruptcy court should make findings
of fact to support its conclusion and should not rely on "mere allega-
tions" of the settling parties. 131
D. Jury Trials
1. Core Proceedings Versus Non-Core Proceedings
Section 157(e) of title 28 states as follows: "If the right to a jury trial
applies in a proceeding that may be heard under this section by a
bankruptcy judge, the bankruptcy judge may conduct the jury trial if
specifically designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district
court and the express consent of all parties." Section 157(e) does not
create any jury trial rights; it merely allows a bankruptcy court to con-
duct a jury trial when a right to the same otherwise exists, subject to
certain limitations.132
On its face, the statute permits the bankruptcy court to conduct jury
trials over both core and non-core proceedings, provided that all par-
ties consent. However, courts have noted that the appellate structure
of bankruptcy procedure may not permit bankruptcy courts to con-
duct jury trials in non-core proceedings, notwithstanding the consent
of the parties. 133 The argument is stated as follows: (1) bankruptcy
courts cannot enter final judgments in non-core matters pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §157(c); (2) the proposed findings of fact and law of the
127. See Armstrong, 285 B.R. 344, 2002 WL 471332 at *3 (citing the Supreme Court's decision
in Protective Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414
(1968)).
128. See In re Turner, 274 B.R. 675, 681 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2002).
129. See A & A Sign Co. v. Maughan, 419 F.2d 1152, 1155 (9th Cir. 1969).
130. 390 U.S. at 424.
131. Id.
132. See In re Mid-Atlantic Resources Corp., 283 B.R. 176, 192 (S.D. W.Va. 2002).
133. See, e.g., In the Matter of RDM Sports Group, Inc., 260 B.R. 915, 921-22 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2001); In re Blackwell, 267 B.R. 724, 728-29 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001).
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bankruptcy court in non-core matters are subject to de novo review by
the district court under the same statute; (3) the findings of fact by a
jury cannot be reviewed de novo pursuant to the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution; and (4) 28 U.S.C. §157(e) is therefore in irrecon-
cilable conflict with the Seventh Amendment, which must govern and
which must prohibit bankruptcy court jury trials on non-core matters.
The Second Circuit, Third Circuit, and Ninth Circuit have adopted
this argument and have prohibited bankruptcy courts from conducting
jury trials in non-core matters.134 Other courts have held that bank-
ruptcy courts may not conduct jury trials on non-core matters but
have not expressly relied on this rationale. 135 Whatever theory is em-
ployed, it is fairly well established that bankruptcy courts may not
conduct jury trials in non-core matters.
Prior to the adoption of 28 U.S.C. §157(e) in 1994, it was not well
established whether bankruptcy courts could conduct jury trials in
core matters. The Fourth, Eighth, Tenth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
had held that bankruptcy courts could not conduct jury trials in core
matters. 136 The Second Circuit disagreed in In re Ben Cooper, Inc.137
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Ben Cooper case and de-
clined to decide the issue in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg.138
However, with the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code and rel-
evant provisions of title 28, including the addition of section 157(e), it
appears clear that a bankruptcy court may conduct jury trials in core
matters, provided all parties consent.
2. Jury Trial Demand
Bankruptcy Rule 9015(b) provides that, if the right to a jury trial
applies, a timely demand has been filed pursuant to Federal Rule 38,
and if the bankruptcy judge has been specially designated to conduct
the jury trial, then the parties may consent to have a jury trial con-
ducted by a bankruptcy judge under section 157(e) by jointly or sepa-
rately filing statements of consent within any applicable time limits
specified by local rule.
134. See In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d 1095, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Cinematronics, Inc.,
916 F.2d 1444, 1451 (9th Cir. 1990); Beard v. Braunstein, 914 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1990).
135. See, e.g., In re Envisionet Computer Services, Inc., 276 B.R. 1, 3 (D. Me. 2002) (citing In
re Larry's Apartment, 210 B.R. 469, 472 (D. Ariz. 1997).
136. See In re Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 127-28 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing In re
United Missouri Bank, N.A., 901 F.2d 1449 (8th Cir. 1990); In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 911 F.2d
380, 392 (10th Cir. 1990); In re Baker & Getty Fin. Servs., Inc., 954 F.2d 1169, 1173 (6th Cir.
1992); In re Girabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1161 (7th Cir. 1992).
137. 896 F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990).
138. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
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Federal Rule 38(b) provides that any party may demand a trial by
jury on any issue triable of right by a jury by (1) serving upon the
other parties a demand in writing at any time after the commence-
ment of the action and not later than ten days after the service of the
last pleading directed at the issue, and (2) filing the demand with the
court pursuant to Federal Rule 5(d).
As described further below, jury trial waiver is the most prevalent
method of disposing of jury trial demands, and one common method
of waiver is the failure to file properly a timely jury trial demand. 139
3. Right to a Jury Trial in Bankruptcy Proceedings
As described above, the bankruptcy court's ability to conduct a jury
trial has no bearing on whether a right to a jury trial exists. The analy-
sis of whether a right to a jury exists in bankruptcy actions centers on
the Supreme Court's decision in Granfinanciera. 492 U.S. at 33. In
Granfinanciera, the Supreme Court made two levels of distinctions
crucial to determining whether a right to a jury trial exists. First, the
Supreme Court held that the Seventh Amendment jury trial right ap-
plies only to legal and not to equitable proceedings. Second, the Su-
preme Court held that the right to a jury trial necessarily attaches only
to legal proceedings involving private rights, not to legal proceedings
involving public rights. The Supreme Court found that a bankruptcy-
related fraudulent conveyance action is a legal, not an equitable, pro-
ceeding involving private, not public, rights. Courts have determined
that the bankruptcy courts are appropriate tribunals for performing
the Granfinanciera analysis and determining whether the right to a
jury trial exists, even if they cannot conduct the jury trial itself.140
4. Creditor's Waiver of Right to Jury Trial
in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Once it is established that a right to a jury trial exists, courts con-
sider whether that right has been waived.
The main thrust of the Granfinanciera opinion involves the question
of whether a creditor that has not filed a proof of claim against the
debtor is entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court's conclusion-
that such a creditor is entitled to a jury trial-skirted the "negative
pregnant" question implied by its holding. However, shortly thereaf-
ter, in Langenkamp v. Culp,14 1 the Supreme Court addressed the
139. See, e.g., In re Big V Holding Corp., 2002 WL 1482392, at *5 (D. Del. 2002).
140. See, e.g., Envisionet, 276 B.R. at 6.
141. 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
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question of whether a creditor that has filed a proof of claim against
the debtor is entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court's answer-
that by filing of a proof of claim a creditor submits itself to the bank-
ruptcy court's equity jurisdiction and thereby waives its right to a jury
trial of an otherwise legal action (such as a preference action)-was
consistent with the Granfinanciera analysis but created a rule of deci-
sion all its own.142
The decisions in Langenkamp and its progeny can be justified on
two theories - the "waiver theory" and the "conversion theory."'
1 43
The "waiver theory" postulates that a creditor's filing of a claim
against the debtor's estate is an affirmative and voluntary act waiving
any Seventh Amendment jury trial right. The "conversion theory," by
contrast, postulates that the creditor's claim converts an otherwise
unilateral attempt to collect a money judgment from that creditor
(which would be a legal action with a corresponding jury trial right)
into a reconciliation of cross-claims between debtor and creditor (an
equitable function of the bankruptcy court to which no jury trial right
attaches). Whichever theory is adopted, the Granfinanciera /
Langenkamp message is the same, that a creditor cannot assert claims
against a debtor's estate and certainly preserve any jury trial right it
may have if sued by the debtor's estate.
Subsequent cases have addressed the practical complexities sur-
rounding the Langenkamp holding. For example, one court has held
that, by withdrawing its proof of claim prior to the commencement of
an action against it, a creditor may regain a jury trial right previously
waived. 144 Other courts have considered the more likely circumstance
in which a creditor that has not filed a proof of claim against a debtor
files a counterclaim or asserts a setoff right in response to a suit by the
debtor or its representatives. 145 Finally, some courts have held that, in
a case in which the bankruptcy court cannot hold a jury trial, a jury
142. See In re Asousa Partnership, 276 B.R. 55, 67 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2002) (holding that credi-
tor that files proof of claim submits to equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy court, for which no jury
trial right exists, but only for counterclaims arising from the same or related transactions as the
creditor's claim).
143. See Control Center, L.L.C. v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269, 279 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (discussing both
theories).
144. See Smith v. Dowden, 47 F.3d 940, 943 (8th Cir. 1995).
145. See Billing v. Ravin, Greenberg & Zacklin, P.A., 22 F.3d 1242, 1253 (3d Cir. 1994) (hold-
ing that debtor was not entitled to jury trial on malpractice claim against attorneys because claim
was asserted in defense of attorneys' fee application); In re NDEP Corp., 203 B.R. 905, 912 (D.
Del. 1996) (holding jury trial right not waived by creditor's filing of permissive counterclaim,
where counterclaims do not affect distributions to other creditors); In re Commercial Financial
Services, Inc., 255 B.R. 68, 72 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2000) (holding that assertion of setoff as de-
fense waives jury trial right).
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trial demand without a timely corresponding motion to withdraw the
reference of the action to the district court constitutes a waiver of a
jury trial right. 146
A helpful summary of the jury trial waiver issue is provided by the
decision in In re Sentry Operating Co. of Texas, Inc.:
One can reconcile the Supreme Court decisions ... as follows: if a
creditor files a proof of claim in a bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy
court should proceed with all dispatch to determine any objections
to that claim, notwithstanding the fact that some of the objections to
the claims might constitute separate actions at law if the creditor
had not filed a proof of claim. The creditor does not have a right to
a jury trial with respect to determination of the creditor's claim
against the estate or with respect to any objections to the claim ....
The creditor retains a right to a jury trial with respect to any issue
that need not be adjudicated as part of the allowance of the claim or
objection to the claim.' 47
5. Debtor's Waiver of Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy
Proceedings
In In re Hallahan, the Seventh Circuit held that a debtor's filing of a
voluntary bankruptcy petition constitutes a full waiver of any jury trial
rights the debtor may have in the course of its bankruptcy case. 148
The Hallahan decision is based on the "waiver theory," however, and
courts that adhere to the "conversion theory" have held otherwise.
For example, the court in In re WSC, Inc., held that the debtor's jury
trial waiver extends only to actions related to the claims allowance
and disallowance process. 149 The debtor's bankruptcy filing does not
automatically "convert" all legal and private actions of the debtor into
equitable and public actions to which no jury trial right attaches. a50
6. The Consequences of Jury Trial Rights
"In the vast majority of cases, the real reason for demanding a jury
trial has less to do with a party's deep and abiding respect for either
the jury system or the majesty of Article III of the Constitution and
much more to do with either opportunistic delay or forum-shop-
146. See In re Sand Hills Beef Corp., 199 B.R. 740 (D. Colo. 1996); In re Blackwell, 279 B.R.
818 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2002).
147. 273 B.R. 515, 523 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2002).
148. 936 F.2d 1496 (7th Cir. 1991).
149. 286 B.R. 321, 328 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2002),
150. See also In re Charlotte Commercial Group, Inc., 288 B.R. 715, 720 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
2003) (holding that debtor's bankruptcy filing resulted in waiver of jury trial right for action
"patently related" to claims allowance process).
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ping. ' 151 This rather cynical view may, unfortunately, have some mo-
ment. In many jury trial right disputes, the consequences intended by
the party seeking the jury trial are (a) a finding that a jury trial right
exists; and (b) either a finding that the action is a non-core proceeding
or a finding that the action is a core proceeding but that the jury trial
cannot take place in the bankruptcy court. In this manner, a party can
use its jury trial right (in some cases coupled with its non-consent to a
bankruptcy court jury trial) to force an action to be moved from the
bankruptcy court to the district court.15 2
E. Appeals: 28 U.S.C. §158 and Bankruptcy Rules Part VIII
The provisions regarding appeals from final orders, judgments, de-
crees, and interlocutory orders (with leave of court) are set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 158, which establishes two types of appeal from the bank-
ruptcy court. The first is to the district court. The second is to a
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel consisting of three bankruptcy judges
from districts within the circuit (for those circuits that have a bank-
ruptcy appellate panel' 5 3). Appeals to the Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel can be taken only with consent of both parties.
Generally speaking, under Bankruptcy Rule 8013, the "clearly erro-
neous" standard of review applies to a bankruptcy judge's factual find-
ings in core proceedings, while the de novo standard is applied to legal
conclusions. 154
Bankruptcy Rule 8002 provides that a notice of appeal must be filed
with the clerk of the bankruptcy court within ten days of the date of
entry of the judgment, order, or decree. To conform with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(2), Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a) was
amended, effective August 1, 1991, to state that a notice of appeal
filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry
151. In re Blackwell, 267 B.R. 724, 727-28 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2001) (emphasis in original).
152. As will be discussed in Section IV.C. below, this technique may not work as planned if
the district court chooses to withdraw the reference of the action only on the eve of trial and
only for the purpose of conducting the jury trial itself (rather than immediately after ruling on a
withdrawal motion and for all purposes in the action). "Many district courts have held that
withdrawal of the reference on the ground that a party is entitled to a jury trial should be de-
ferred until the case is 'trial ready."' In re Northwestern Inst. of Psychiatry, Inc., 268 B.R. 79, 84
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
153. Currently, the First, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have Bankruptcy Appellate
Panels ("BAPs").
154. See, e.g., In re Daniel-Head and Assocs., 819 F.2d 914, 918 (9th Cir. 1987); In re Phillips,
804 F.2d 930, 932 (6th Cir. 1986); In re Ocasio, 272 B.R. 815, 822 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2002). Only
"persons aggrieved" have standing to appeal from a bankruptcy court order. See Spenlinhauer v.
O'Donnell, 261 F.3d 113, 117-18 (1st Cir. 2001) (defining "person aggrieved" to mean an appel-
lant whose pecuniary interests are directly and adversely affected by the challenged order).
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of the order shall be treated as if filed on the date of entry of the
order. Under Bankruptcy Rule 8002(c), the bankruptcy judge may
grant a party an extension of up to twenty additional days to file an
appeal. The request for additional time must be made before expira-
tion of the original ten days, and the appeal may in no case be filed
later than thirty days after entry of the judgment, order, or decree.
Appeals as a matter of right may be taken only upon entry of a final
order. The question of what constitutes a final order in a bankruptcy
case or proceeding for purposes of appeal has been the subject of
much dispute. "The standard for determining 'finality' in the bank-
ruptcy context requires a discrete dispute within the larger bankruptcy
proceeding and involves an order that does 'conclusively determine'
the outcome of the litigation at least with respect to some 'discrete
dispute within the larger case." 155 Because of the number of distinct
disputes within a single bankruptcy case, "finality" in bankruptcy is
more flexible than in other contexts.15 6 Final orders may include or-
ders denying claimed exemptions of individual debtors, 57 orders dis-
missing adversary proceedings (but not those declining to dismiss
adversary proceedings), 158 orders denying the discharge of individual
debtors,159 orders dismissing appeals,160 orders granting relief from
stay (but not orders denying relief from stay), 161 orders disallowing
claims, 162 and default judgments.163
The general principle underlying "finality" is that decisions are final
when no issues remain to be resolved, so that the only remaining ac-
tion to be taken is the execution of a judgment. 164 Some issues, such
as the determination of whether attorney fees should be awarded to
the prevailing party, are collateral to the primary action and do not
affect finality. 165 When a district court affirms, reverses, or remands a
decision of the bankruptcy court, the district court decision will be
155. In re Salem Suede, Inc., 221 B.R. 586, 595 (D. Mass. 1998).
156. See id. See also Bradshaw v. United States, 283 B.R. 814, 816-17 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2002); In
re Bank of New England Corp., 218 B.R. 643, 647 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 1998).
157. In the Matter of Orso, 283 B.R. 686, 690 (5th Cir. 2002).
158. In re Franchesi, 43 Fed. Appx. 87, 89 (9th Cir. 2002). But see In re Vlasek, 2003 WL
1858154, *4 (7th Cir. 2003).
159. In re Roberts, 279 B.R. 396, 399 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000).
160. In re Kujawa, 323 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 2003).
161. In re Henriquez, 261 B.R. 67, 69-70 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2001).
162. Greer v. O'Dell, 305 F.3d 1297, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).
163. In re Warner, 247 B.R. 24, 25 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2000).
164. See In re Atlas, 210 F.3d 1305, 1307 (11th Cir. 2000).
165. See id.
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final unless the district court directs the bankruptcy court to take fur-
ther actions that are more than ministerial in nature. 166
Several courts have strictly construed the requirement of Federal
Rule 54, as incorporated in Rule 9021(a), that all final orders and
judgments must be set forth in a separate document, and these courts
have dismissed appeals for lack of jurisdiction where no such separate
document is in the record on appeal. 167
Parties may not, as of right, take appeal from non-final orders, but a
court may allow such "interlocutory" appeals in its discretion. "The
decision to grant leave to file an interlocutory appeal from the bank-
ruptcy court lies within the discretion of the district court.' 68 Nor-
mally, a party seeking leave to file an interlocutory appeal will file a
separate motion with the district court along with the notice of appeal.
"Where no such motion is filed, however, Bankruptcy Rule 8003 al-
lows a court to treat a notice of appeal as a motion for leave to ap-
peal. ' 169 In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2) provides for immediate
appeals to circuit courts on appeal, upon agreement of the parties or
upon the court's own motion, under limited circumstances, including
questions of law without controlling court of appeals or Supreme
Court precedent, questions of law requiring resolution of conflicting
decisions, and instances where immediate appeals may materially ad-
vance the progress of the cases at issue. One or more parties may
request that the lower court certify an immediate appeal, but there is a
sixty-day withdraw for such a request.170
F. Motions to Reconsider
Prior to commencing an appeal, the prospective appellant should
consider moving the bankruptcy court for reconsideration of the order
under Bankruptcy Rule 9024. Bankruptcy Rule 9024 incorporates
Federal Rule 60, with certain limitations (e.g., removing the one-year
time limit for filing motions to reconsider orders disallowing bank-
ruptcy claims). Some courts have stated that it is a well-settled princi-
ple of the "law of the case" doctrine that motions to reconsider may
be granted only where there is (a) "an intervening change of control-
ling law," (b) "the availability of new evidence," or (c) "the need to
166. See In re Pransky, 318 F.3d 536, 540-41 (3d Cir. 2003); In re Lundell, 223 F.3d 1035, 1038
(9th Cir. 2000).
167. See, e.g., Matter of Moralez, 553 F.2d 1192 (9th Cir. 1977), rev'd on other grounds, 618
F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing U.S. v. Indrelunas, 411 U.S. 216 (1973)).
168. Monahan v. Massachusetts Dept. of Revenue, 215 B.R. 287, 288 (D. Mass. 1997) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 158(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 8001(b)).
169. Id.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(B) and (E).
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correct a clear error or prevent a manifest injustice. ' ' 171 These factors
comport with Federal Rule 60's six grounds for relief from a judgment
or order:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3)
fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), mis-
representation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other rea-
son justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
The "mistake," "inadvertence," and "excusable neglect"1 72 standards
have been interpreted rather broadly by some courts.173
Motions to reconsider generally may not be used to relitigate a mat-
ter that a party failed to litigate adequately at the first hearing. 174 Mo-
tions for reconsideration are appropriate in cases such as those in
which a court has patently misunderstood a party, has made a decision
outside the adversarial issues presented to the court, or has made an
error not of reasoning but of apprehension. 175 Motions to reconsider
may be denied solely because a movant fails to cite any adequate basis
for reconsideration. 176
Most important to the filing of a motion to reconsider is its timeli-
ness. Although Bankruptcy Rule 9024 and Federal Rule 60 contain
some limitations regarding the periods of time in which motions for
reconsideration may be filed, some Local Bankruptcy Rules signifi-
cantly cut back these periods. For example, Federal Rule 60 contains
a general one-year time period, and Bankruptcy Rule 9024 contains
several exceptions to that period, but Local Bankruptcy Rule 9023-1
in the Northern District of Georgia prohibits the filing of motions for
reconsideration following ten days after the contested order is
entered.
171. Official Committee of the Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand,
LLP, 322 F.3d 147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003); Ameritrust Company, N.A. v. C.K. White, 1996 WL
132998 (N.D. Ga. 1996). See also 18B CHARLES WRIGHT, ET AL., FED. PRACTICE AND PROC.
§ 4478 (2d ed. 2002).
172. The leading decision regarding "excusable neglect" is the Supreme Court's opinion in
Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. L.P., 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
173. See, e.g., In re USN Communications, Inc., 288 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
174. See In re Beckett, 1999 WL 33588546 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1999).
175. See In re Stotler and Co., 1991 WL 268051 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
176. See In re Giordano, 202 F.3d 277 (Table), 1999 WL 1054726 (9th Cir. 1999).
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G. Duties of Counsel'and Parties in Interest in Bankruptcy
1. Contempt
Although once a subject of some dispute, the overwhelming major-
ity of courts now uphold the bankruptcy court's contempt power
based on the equitable powers granted to the bankruptcy court under
11 U.S.C. § 105 and the consistency of civil contempt power with the
bankruptcy court's other powers, such as the power to issue injunc-
tions, enforce settlements, sanction attorneys and impose sanctions for
abuse of process.177 Bankruptcy Rule 9020 describes the procedure
for contempt proceedings for both actions committed in the presence
of the bankruptcy judge and actions committed outside the presence
of the bankruptcy judge.
The civil contempt power is considered to be consistent with the
congressional goal of speed and efficiency within the bankruptcy court
system. Civil contempt may be used against both corporate entities
and individuals. 178 However, 11 U.S.C. § 362(k) provides that an "in-
dividual injured by any willful violation of a stay" is entitled to dam-
ages and, in appropriate cases, punitive damages (emphasis added).
This section does not make reference to corporations; nevertheless,
many of the authorities cited above provide such relief to corporations
under Bankruptcy Code Section 105.179
A less settled question is whether the bankruptcy court possesses
criminal contempt powers. While some courts have held that a bank-
ruptcy court may recommend to the district court its findings and con-
clusions with respect to a criminal contempt proceeding, 180 o other
177. Some courts have distinguished the inherent powers to remedy violation of orders, which
powers are available to all courts, from statutory powers of contempt, as under section 105. See
In re Just Brakes Corporate Systems, Inc., 108 F.3d 881, 885 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Jove Engineer-
ing, Inc., 92 F.3d 1539, 1553-54 (11th Cir. 1996).
178. See, e.g., In re Skinner, 917 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding corporate creditor in viola-
tion of stay and subject to monetary damages); In re Haddad, 68 B.R. 944 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1987) (finding individual debtor in contempt for failing to comply with bankruptcy court order
and voiding debtor's exemption); In re Walters, 868 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding contempt
where debtor's attorney refused to return fees upon court order); Matter of Lemco Gypsum,
Inc., 95 B.R. 860 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1989) (ordering corporation and individual in control of such
corporation to pay money damages); In re McNeil, 128 B.R. 603 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991) (order-
ing corporation to pay money damages and attorneys' fees); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 26 B.R.
919 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding individual creditor and her attorneys in contempt for viola-
tion of stay).
179. See In re Spookyworld, Inc., 346 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2003) (hdlding that "individual" does not
include corporation for purposes of Section 362(k) (formerly Section 362(h)).
180. See Midwest Properties No. Two v. Big Hill Investment Co., 93 B.R. 357 (N.D. Tex.
1988); In re Crabtree, 47 B.R. 150 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1985),
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courts have affirmatively held that the bankruptcy court does not have
jurisdiction to preside over a criminal contempt proceeding. 181
2. Counsel's Liability for Excessive Costs Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, a courtrmay require any attorney who mul-
tiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees rea-
sonably incurred as a result of such conduct. The majority of courts
have held that the bankruptcy court has the authority to award sanc-
tions under section 1927.182
3. Sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011
Bankruptcy Rule 9011 adopts the provisions of Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules.183 Bankruptcy Rule 9011(a) requires the signing of plead-
ings, and Bankruptcy Rule 9011(b) provides that such signature is
equivalent to a certification by the signatory that the information
therein is not being presented for an improper purpose, and that the
allegations and defenses are warranted and supported, to the best of
the signatory's knowledge. Bankruptcy Rule 9011(c) contains the pro-
cedure for imposing sanctions for the violation of these provisions,
and Bankruptcy Rule 9011(d) exempts from these bankruptcy sanc-
tions conduct in discovery, which is instead governed by the Federal
Rules.
Often contested matters and adversary proceedings are settled prior
to a hearing or pretrial conference, and stipulations of settlement or
agreed orders are filed with the bankruptcy court. However, attor-
neys should take note of the local practice governing whether they are
required to attend hearings in which settlements or agreements have
been reached. Some bankruptcy courts may impose sanctions on an
attorney for failing to attend a scheduled hearing, even if attendance
is a mere formality in light of the settlement or agreement.
181. See, e.g., In re Finney, 167 B.R. 820, 823-24 (E.D. Va. 1994); Matter of Hipp, Inc., 895
F.2d 1503 (5th Cir. 1990).
182. See e.g., In re TCI Limited, 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Chissom, 68 B.R. 471, 473
(9th Cir. B.A.P. 1986), aff d, 847 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 892 (1988); In re
Outlaw, 66 B.R. 413, 418 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986); In re Interstate Steel Setters, Inc., 65 B.R. 312
(Bankr. N.D. 11. 1986). But see In re Arkansas Communities, Inc., 827 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1987).
183. See, e.g., In re Gioioso, 979 F.2d 956 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Graham, 981 F.2d 1135 (10th
Cir. 1992); Cinema Service Corp. v. Edbee Corp., 774 F.2d 584, 585 (3d Cir. 1985).
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IV. GETING OUT OF BANKRUPTCY COURT
A. Remand to State Courts
State court actions removed to bankruptcy courts do not necessarily
remain in the bankruptcy courts. Removed actions may travel back to
the state courts from which they came pursuant to mandatory and dis-
cretionary abstention (discussed in Section IV.B. below) 184 or pursu-
ant to equitable remand.
The equitable remand of removed actions is governed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1452(b), which states that a removed action may be remanded "on
any equitable ground." While "any equitable ground" is obviously a
broad standard for determining whether remand is appropriate, the
Courts have attempted to define the scope of the standard by identify-
ing as many as fourteen relevant factors:
1. the effect or lack thereof on the efficient administration of the
estate;
2. the extent to which state law issues predominate over bank-
ruptcy issues;
3. the difficulty or unsettled nature of the applicable law;
4. the presence of related proceedings commenced in state court
or otherwise;
5. the court's jurisdictional basis, if any, other than 28 U.S.C.
§ 1334;
6. the degree of relatedness or remoteness of the proceeding to
the main bankruptcy case;
7. the substance rather than the form of an asserted core
proceeding;
8. the feasibility of severing state law claims from core bank-
ruptcy matters to allow judgments to be entered in state court
with enforcemenf'left to the bankruptcy court;
9. the burden of the bankruptcy court's docket;
10. the likelihood that the commencement of the proceeding in
the bankruptcy court involves forum shopping by one of the
parties;
11. the existence of a right to trial by jury;
12. the presence in the proceeding of nondebtor parties;
13. comity; and
14. the possibility of prejudice to other parties in the action.' 85
184. As discussed in more detail in Section IV.B., there is a difference of opinion as to
whether the abstention doctrine can technically apply to removed actions. However, courts gen-
erally agree that "discretionary abstention" and "equitable remand" are concepts based on the
same principles, evaluating the same factors, and reaching the same results.
185. See Renaissance Cosmetics, Inc. v. Development Specialists Inc., 277 B.R. 5, 14
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Broyles v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 266 B.R. 778, 785 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Blanton v.
IMN Financial Corp., 260 B.R. 257, 265 (M.D.N.C. 2001); Santa Clara, 223 B.R. at 46.
[Vol. 3:383
BANKRUPTCY COURT JURISDICTION
At least one court has held that a removed action must be re-
manded if it would be subject to mandatory abstention by the bank-
ruptcy court under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(2).186 As noted above, the
technical relationship of abstention to remand is confusing, although
the principles and results are often the same. For example, the lack of
jurisdiction is at times cited as grounds for remand, although it is un-
clear whether this presumably mandatory "lack of jurisdiction re-
mand" is actually remand, abstention, or simply a finding that removal
never effectively occurred. 187
Like its sister statute 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), which governs removal of
state actions to federal courts generally, 28 U.S.C. § 1452(b) provides
that "[a]n order entered under this subsection remanding a claim or
cause of action, or a decision not to remand, is not reviewable by ap-
peal or otherwise by the court of appeals . . . or by the Supreme
Court.... " Prior to the 1990 amendments to the Bankruptcy Rules, a
bankruptcy court's role in remanding actions was limited to filing a
report and making a recommendation regarding remand to the district
court. Currently, a bankruptcy court may enter an order of remand,
but the district court may review that order and make the final, unap-
pealable determination regarding remand.
B. Abstention
Another way that an action may avoid determination in the bank-
ruptcy court is by application of an abstention doctrine. In bank-
ruptcy, a court's ability to abstain from hearing an action may be
derived from several sources: section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code,
section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c), and non-
statutory doctrines arising from federal jurisprudence generally.
1. Section 305 Abstention
The court may abstain from hearing the entire bankruptcy case
under section 305 of the Bankruptcy Code if (a) it is in the best inter-
ests of creditors and the debtor or (b) a petition under chapter 11 for
recognition of a foreign proceeding has been granted and the pur-
poses of chapter 15 would be best served by suspension or dismis-
sal. 188 Section 305(a)(1) abstention on "best interest" grounds is a
186. In re Pacor, Inc., 72 B.R. 927, 931 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987), affd, 86 B.R. 808 (E.D. Pa.
1988).
187. See, e.g., Retirement Systems of Alabama, 209 F. Supp. at 1259. See also Santa Clara, 223
B.R. at 49.
188. See In re Paper I Partners, L.P., 283 B.R. 661, 678-80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (labeling
section 305 abstention "extraordinary relief"). See also In re Globo Comunicacoes e Par-
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truly rare occurrence that might apply, for example, if two identical
bankruptcy cases were filed for the same debtor in two different dis-
tricts (the domestic analog of an abstention in favor of chapter 15
under section 305(b)).
2. Section 505 Abstention
Section 505 of the Bankruptcy Code permits the bankruptcy court
to make certain findings with respect to the tax liability of the debtor
(such as the amount or legality of a tax not previously determined)
and prohibits the bankruptcy court from making other findings with
respect to tax refunds and tax matters previously determined. Courts
have construed section 505's permissive language to allow the bank-
ruptcy court to abstain from all tax matters, if the bankruptcy court
determines in its discretionary authority that abstention is appropri-
ate.189 The Second Circuit fias cited the following factors relevant to
the section 505 abstention analysis: (1) the complexity of the tax issue;
(2) the need to administer the bankruptcy case in an expeditious fash-
ion; (3) the burden on the bankruptcy court's docket; (4) the length of
time necessary to conduct the hearing and render a decision thereaf-
ter; (5) the asset and liability structure of the debtor; and (6) the po-
tential prejudice to the debtor, the taxing authority, and creditors. 190
The Fifth Circuit has focused on whether the bankruptcy issues will
predominate and whether the Bankruptcy Code's objectives will po-
tentially be impaired.19' A decision from the District of Massachu-
setts has considered the six factors cited by the Second Circuit.192
3. Abstention Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334
Abstention from matters arising in connection with bankruptcy pro-
ceedings (i.e., adversary proceedings and contested matters) is gov-
erned by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c). Under section 1334(c)(1), the district
court may decline to exercise bankruptcy jurisdiction "in the interest
of justice, or in the interest of comity with State courts or respect for
State law" (except cases under chapter 15, where the court's jurisdic-
tion is specifically designed to be exercised in coordination with a for-
eign court). However, if the elements of section 1334(c)(2) are
ticipacoes S.A. ("Globopar"), 317 B.R. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 204) (addressing section 305(a)(1)
abstention).
189. See In re New Haven Projects Ltd. Liability Co., 225 F.3d 283, 288 (2d Cir. 2000); In the
Matter of Luongo, 259 B.R. 323, 330 (5th Cit. 2001).
190. See New Haven Projects, 225 F.3d. at 289.
191. See Luongo, 259 B.R. at 332.
192. See In re St. John's Nursing Home, Inc., 169 B.R. 795, 804 (D. Mass. 1994).
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present, abstention is mandatory. The procedures governing motions
for abstention are set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 5011. Section 1334(d)
provides that decisions to abstain or not to abstain under section
1334(c)(1) and decisions to abstain under section 1334(c)(2) are not
reviewable by courts of appeals or by the Supreme Court. Decisions
not to abstain under section 1334(c)(2) are not subject to this limita-
tion, and all abstention decisions of the bankruptcy court may be re-
viewed by the district court.
a. "Discretionary" or "Permissive" Abstention
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(c)(1), the district court may exercise "dis-
cretionary" or "permissive" abstention as to any proceeding regard-
less of whether it falls within the bankruptcy court's "core" or "related
to" jurisdiction. While the statute defines permissive abstention quite
broadly, most decisions have given a narrow construction to the terms
"interest of justice," "interest of comity with state courts," and "re-
spect of state law."
Many courts have developed lists of factors for evaluating motions
to abstain under section 1334(c)(1). 193 Courts agree that these factors
are the same as or similar to the factors considered when analyzing
whether equitable remand is appropriate. 194 A list of fourteen of
these factors is set forth in Section IV.A. above.
b. Mandatory Abstention
Unlike discretionary abstention, mandatory abstention under sec-
tion 1334(c)(2) applies only if the proceeding is a non-core proceed-
ing.195 The five-prong test for determining whether mandatory
abstention is appropriate for non-core matters is well-settled:
1. a timely motion is made;
2. the proceeding is based upon a state law claim or state law cause of
action;
3. the proceeding is related to a case under title 11;
4. the action could not have been commenced in a federal court absent
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334; and
5. an action is commenced and can be timely adjudicated in a state
forum of appropriate jurisdiction. 196
193. See, e.g., In re Valley Media, Inc., 289 B.R. 27, 29-30 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003).
194. See Renaissance Cosmetics, 277 B.R. at 18; Broyles, 266 B.R. at 785; Blanton, 260 B.R. at
265.
195. See Broyles, 266 B.R. at 782.
196. See Renaissance Cosmetics, 277 B.R. at 12; McDowell Welding & Pipefitting, Inc. v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 285 B.R. 460, 475 (D. Or. 2002); Broyles, 266 B.R. at 782r83; Blanton, 260 B.R. at
263; In re Boughton, 60 B.R. 373, 375 (N.D. I11. 1986).
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If any one factor is missing, mandatory abstention is inappropriate.
As to the fifth prong, courts have considered a number of factors in
determining whether an action can be "timely adjudicated" in the
state courts: (1) the backlog of the state court and the federal court
calendar; (2) the status of the proceeding in state court prior to being
removed; (3) the status of the bankruptcy case; (4) the complexity of
the issues to be resolved; (5) whether the parties consent to the bank-
ruptcy court entering judgment in the non-core case; (6) whether jury
demand has been made; and (7) whether the underlying bankruptcy
case is a reorganization or a liquidation case. 197
There is a split among Courts of Appeal as to whether the
mandatory abstention doctrine applies at all to cases removed from
state court. One argument is that once removed, no action exists in
the state court, and abstention would be tantamount to dismissal, a
result potentially disastrous to the. rights of the parties. 198 Other
courts have held the opposite, finding re-commencement of the state
court action satisfactory for the purposes of section 1334(c). 199
4. Other Types of Abstention
Two other, non-statutory types of abstention may also apply to
bankruptcy proceedings: the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and the Bur-
ford doctrine. The Rooker-Feldman and Burford absention doctrines
are fairly rare in the bankruptcy context but do apply from time to
time in cases where a final state court judgment or a preeminent state
policy would be disrupted by an inconsistent federal court decision.
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which is applicable to both
bankruptcy courts and district courts, "lower federal courts lack sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over a case if the exercise of jurisdiction over
that case would result in the reversal or modification of a state court
judgment. '200 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends to cases that are
"inextricably intertwined" with a state court determination. 201 How-
ever, if a state court judgment is void ab initio, as judgments in viola-
197. See In re United Container LLC, 284 B.R. 162, 174-75 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2002).
198. See In re Lazar, 237 F.3d 967, 981-82 (9th Cir. 2001); McDowell Welding, 285 B.R. at 475.
199. See Christo v. Padgett, 223 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2000); Covanta Onondaga Ltd. v.
Onondaga Cty. Resource Recovery Agency, 281 B.R. 809, 816 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
200. In re Salem, 290 B.R. 479, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting Hachamovitch v. DeBuono, 159
F.3d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1998)). See also In re Middlesex Power Equipment & Marine, Inc., 292
F.3d 61, 66 (1st Cir. 2002).
201. See Salem, 290 B.R. at 482-83.
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tion of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay may be,20 2 then the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine will not apply.
The Burford doctrine provides that "abstention is appropriate in
two circumstances: (1) cases involving difficult questions or state law
bearing on policy problems of substantial public import whose impor-
tance transcends the result in the case; and (2) where federal adjudica-
tion of the case would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to matters of substantial public importance. '2 0 3
C. Withdrawal of the Reference
As discussed above,20 4 Congress has granted the federal district
courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters
and empowered federal district courts to refer such matters to the
bankruptcy courts:
Each district court may provide that any or all cases under title 11
and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or re-
lated to a case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy
judges for the district.20 5
As a general matter, the federal district courts have adopted stand-
ing orders referring bankruptcy matters to the bankruptcy courts
under 28 U.S.C. §157(a). 20 6 In other words, referral of bankruptcy
matters to the bankruptcy courts is generally automatic and routine,
and no case-by-case determination is made when such matters are re-
ferred. However, Congress also permitted the federal district courts
to revoke a referral to the bankruptcy courts:
202. There has traditionally been a split of authority as to whether acts done in violation of
the automatic stay (and injunctions generally) are void ab initio or merely voidable upon order
of the court. See, e.g., Eastern Refractions Co. Inc. v. Forty Eight Insulations Inc., 157 F.3d 169,
172 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Competrol Acquisition Partnership, L.P., 176 B.R. 723, 729 (citing In re
Ward, 837 F.2d 124, 126 (3d Cir. 1988)). If a state court judgment was void upon entry under the
"void ab initio" rule, then the Rooker-Feldman doctrine cannot be available to preserve the
effect of the judgment. However, if a state court judgment is merely voidable upon a subsequent
ruling of a bankruptcy court that the judgment violated the automatic stay, then the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine may be available-because the judgment is in effect when the Rooker-Feld-
man doctrine is applied.
203. Munich American Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 1998). How-
ever, the Burford doctrine applies "only where the relief being sought is equitable or otherwise
discretionary." Gross v. Weingarten, 217 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Quackenbush v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 731 (1996)).
204. See Section II.A.l.d. above.
205. 28 U.S.C. §157(a).
206. At times, such as the recent period when the functionalities of the overburdened Dela-
ware bankruptcy courts was at issue, district courts may revoke their standing orders and con-
sider the reference of bankruptcy cases and proceedings ad hoc.
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The district court may withdraw, in whole or in part,2 0 7 any case or
proceeding referred under this section, on its own motion or on timely
motion of any party, for cause shown. The district court shall, on
timely motion of a party, so withdraw a proceeding if the court deter-
mines that resolution of the proceeding 'requires consideration of both
title 11 and other laws of the United States regulating organizations or
activities affecting interstate commerce.20 8
Pursuant to these statutes and the federal district court standing or-
ders, the established rule is that "cases under title 11 and any or all
proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a case
under title 11" are first heard before the bankruptcy court, unless the
federal district court invokes a mandatory or discretionary withdrawal
of the reference with respect to a particular case of proceeding.
It is wrong to confuse withdrawal of the reference with abstention.
By withdrawing the reference, the federal district court substitutes it-
self for the bankruptcy court as the tribunal presiding over the case or
proceeding. The case or proceeding is not itself affected, however,
and is adjudicated much as if it had remained in the bankruptcy court.
By abstaining, on the other hand, a bankruptcy court or federal dis-
trict court refrains from hearing a case or proceeding, normally be-
cause there is another court in which similar issues are pending.
Abstention stops the progress of a bankruptcy case or proceeding al-
together; withdrawal of the reference simply moves a bankruptcy case
or proceeding from the bankruptcy court to the federal district court.
1. Mandatory Withdrawal of the Reference
The second sentence of section 157(d) requires the district court to
withdraw the reference if "laws of the United States regulating organi-
zations or activities affecting interstate commerce" other than bank-
ruptcy laws must be resolved in the case or proceeding. This standard,
in its broadest application, could prevent bankruptcy courts from pre-
siding over a wide range of actions and "eviscerate much of the work
of the bankruptcy courts. °20 9 Initially, practitioners and scholars
feared that this provision would bring back a version of the summary/
plenary jurisdiction litigation that has troubled the bankruptcy courts
207. See Abondolo v. GGR Holbrook Medford, Inc., 285 B.R. 101 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (with-
drawing reference only as to specific issues, as opposed to withdrawing reference as to an entire
case or proceeding).
208. 28 U.S.C. §157(d).
209. In the Matter of Vicars Insurance Agency, Inc., 96 F.3d 949, 953 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting
In re Adelphi Institute, Inc., 112 B.R. 534, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
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prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code. However, courts
have interpreted the mandatory withdrawal provision narrowly.210
The "substantial and material consideration" test has been widely
adopted as the central inquiry in the mandatory withdrawal analysis.
In In re Camden Ordnance Mfg. Co. of Arkansas, Inc., the court incor-
porated this standard into a three-part mandatory withdrawal test: (1)
the person seeking withdrawal must be a party to the proceeding; (2)
the motion to withdraw the reference must be timely filed; and (3) the
resolution of the proceeding must require substantial and material
consideration of non-bankruptcy federal law.2z1
Courts have generally held that the "simple application of well set-
tled law" does not trigger the "substantial and material consideration"
standard, which is more akin to "complex interpretation. 2 12 The
speculative or hypothetical existence of non-bankruptcy issues will not
permit mandatory withdrawal.213
The timeliness requirement for mandatory withdrawal has also been
stressed. 21 4
2. Permissive Withdrawal of the Reference
Permissive withdrawal of the reference "for cause shown" is within
the discretion of the district courts.215 Courts have considered a num-
ber of overlapping factors in deciding whether to withdraw the refer-
ence under the first sentence of section 157(d), including the
following: (1) judicial economy; (2) uniform bankruptcy administra-
tion; (3) reduction of forum shopping; (4) economical use of debtors'
and creditors' resources; (5) expediting the bankruptcy process; (6)
the presence of a jury demand; (7) whether the claim is core or non-
210. See In re White Motor Corp., 42 B.R. 693, 703-06 (N.D. Ohio 1984) (holding that motions
for mandatory withdrawal should be granted only if the proceedings cannot be resolved without
"substantial and material consideration" of non-bankruptcy federal commercial law).
211. 245 B.R. 794, 805-60 (E.D. Pa. 2000),
212. See Camden Ordance, 245 B.R. at 806. See also Vicars Insurance, 96 F.3d at 954 ("We
therefore hold that as far as non-title 11 issues are presented, mandatory withdrawal is required
only when those issues require the interpretation, as opposed to the mere application, of the
non-title 11 statute, or when the court must undertake analysis of significant open and un-
resolved issues regarding the non-title 11 law. The legal questions involved need not be of 'cos-
mic proportions' [citation omitted], but must involve more than mere application of existing law
to new facts.").
213. See id.
214. See In re Stavriotis, 111 B.R. 154 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding that a motion for withdrawal
failed to meet the "threshold requirement" of timeliness because the motion should have been
filed "as soon as possible" after learning that federal law would be implicated).
215. See Security Farms v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehouse-
man & Helpers, 124 F.3d 999, 1008 (9th Cir. 1997).
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core; (8) whether the action is within the expertise of the bankruptcy
court; and (9) other related factors.216
Two of the more important factors are the presence of a jury de-
mand and whether the claim is core or non-core, because of the re-
strictions on the. ability of a bankruptcy court to conduct jury trials
and to make final determinations in non-core matters. If the district
court will be required to hear the case at some point in any event
(whether under its original jurisdiction or an appellate de novo re-
view), withdrawal of the reference upon the motion of a party is more
likely, on the grounds of judicial efficiency. 217
3. Procedure for Withdrawing the Reference
Although motions for withdrawal of the reference are properly
heard by district courts under Bankruptcy Rule 5011(a), district courts
may remand to the bankruptcy court for determination of specific per-
missive withdrawal factors, such as whether the action is core or non-
core and whether a jury trial right exists.218
While a motion for withdrawal is pending, a bankruptcy court may
stay the proceedings in the bankruptcy court, in whole or in part, al-
though the legal and practical hurdles to obtain this relief are substan-
tial. Courts have considered factors under Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c)
that are akin to the factors considered by courts responding to re-
quests for preliminary injunctions: (1) the likelihood that the with-
drawal motion will succeed on the merits; (2) whether the movant
under Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c) will be irreparably harmed if the stay
is denied; (3) whether the other parties will be substantially harmed
by the stay; and (4) whether the public interest will be served by
granting the stay.219 In addition, as noted in Section III.D.6. above,
motions to withdraw the reference on the grounds of a jury trial de-
216. See, e.g., In re Simmons, 200 F.3d 738, 742 (11th Cir. 2000); Security Farms, 124 F.3d at
1008; In re Burger Boys, Inc., 94 F.3d 755, 762 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Orion Pictures Corp., 4 F.3d
1094, 1101 (2d Cir. 1993); Mulone v. Norwest Financial California, Inc., 245 B.R. 389, 400 (E.D.
Cal. 2000) (finding class action more appropriately heard by district court, which was more fa-
miliar with class proceedings).
217. See Security Farms, 124 F.3d at 1008; Burger Boys, 94 F.3d at 762; Orion, 4 F.3d at 1101;
In re Lawrence Group, Inc., 285 B.R. 784, 788 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). A recent example of permissive
withdrawal of the reference is the withdrawal from the Delaware bankruptcy court of several
mass tort asbestos bankruptcy cases (such as W.R. Grace and Federal-Mogul) to a single federal
district court in order to achieve judicial economy and consistent judgments in cases with similar
facts and legal issues.
218. See In re Envisionet Computer Services Inc., 276 BR. 1, 7 (D. Me. 2002).
219. See In re Northwestern Inst. of Psychiatry, Inc., 268 B.R. 79, 83 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2001).
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mand are often not granted until the case is "trial ready," rendering a
Bankruptcy Rule 5011(c) stay inappropriate and impractical.220
V. CONCLUSION
Bankruptcy court jurisdiction adds a layer of complexity to federal
court litigation that can be important to the clients of business lawyers
and litigators alike. The Bankruptcy Code itself defers to applicable
state law in many respects, and the Supreme Court has limited the
authority that federal district courts may confer upon bankruptcy
courts. These factors make bankruptcy practice especially sensitive to
the world outside the bankruptcy courts. However, one of the princi-
ples of the Bankruptcy Code is the centralization of all disputes affect-
ing the debtor into a single forum. There is therefore a constant
tension created by the pressure urging disputes to be cast away from
the bankruptcy courts and the pressure urging disputes to be drawn
into the bankruptcy courts, between the exercise and non-exercise of
bankruptcy court jurisdiction.
At the same time, bankruptcy court practice involves a number of
rules and customs aiming toward a method of dispute resolution that
is speedier and more inclusive of all affected parties than ordinary
federal court litigation. Conscientious regard for these rules and cus-
toms is essential to the effective representation of clients in bank-
ruptcy court.
In sum, bankruptcy court practice provides abundant opportunities
for attorneys to seek advantages for their clients with respect to
whether, where, when, and how an action will be heard. Through an
understanding of the issues discussed above, a practitioner should be
able to identify and investigate some of the more important issues af-
fecting a client's interests under the Bankruptcy Code.
220. See Northwestern Psychiatry, 268 B.R. at 84.
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